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Abstract 
 
The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre introduced a new era of counter-terrorism 
initiatives, seemingly to match the heightened terrorist threat. Amongst these initiatives was 
the controversial extraordinary rendition programme led by the US, assisted by the UK 
amongst other States, which centred on the torture of those suspected of contributing to Islamic 
terrorism. This programme signified that States are prepared to allow their agents to commit or 
be complicit in acts that are internationally prohibited. 
There has been plenty of academic discussion into the use of torture on terrorist suspects since 
these revelations. This thesis will not just critically examine previous proposals for the use of 
torture in post-9/11 counter-terrorism, including torture warrants, torture lite, and ex-post 
defences, but it will go further by examining these proposals in the context of State complicity. 
This thesis will discuss complicity to mean receiving information from another State procured 
from torture, and/or enabling another State to commit torture.  
It will critically discuss the morality of complicity in torture, how complicity in torture would 
improve counter-terrorism efforts, and how complicity would fit within the current legal 
framework. It will conclude that complicity in the use of torture is morally sound if it will 
directly prevent a terrorist attack from occurring, but that information obtained by torture 
would not be useful to a receiving State, because information obtained by torture is too 
unreliable to be used for both prevention and prosecution of terrorism. Therefore, it will argue 
that none of the previous proposals would be legally workable for the complicity of torture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 LITERATURE REVIEW & INTRODUCTION 
 
There have been many arguments made about the State’s attitude towards basic human rights 
in their quest to fight the threat of terrorism. These have included the mass-collection of 
information and surveillance,1 the use of drones to target terrorist strongholds,2 and the 
indefinite detention of suspects,3 amongst other concerns. This thesis will discuss what is 
debatably the most concerning: torture. Torture has been described as ‘the calculated infliction 
of pain’,4 which ‘violates the physical and mental integrity of the person subjected to it, negates 
her autonomy, and deprives her of human dignity.’5 Between the Second World War and 9/11, 
torture did not appear to be considered a particularly credible method of intelligence collection. 
Torture tends to be viewed as a medieval practise, or its modern day use limited to States 
headed by dictators, committed in filthy cells in States without a discernible justice system. 
Before the attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001, it could be said that ‘no other 
practice except slavery is so universally condemned in law and human convention as torture.’6  
Times have however since changed, and it appears that since the 9/11 attacks, the idea of using 
torture has gained momentum, by heads of State, politicians and academics alike. George W. 
                                                          
1 Owen Bowcott, ‘Mass surveillance exposed by Snowden ‘not justified by fight against terrorism’’  (The 
Guardian, 08/12/2014) www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/08/mass-surveillance-exposed-edward-
snowden-not-justified-by-fight-against-terrorism, Accessed: 27/06/2016 
2 The US received international criticism for attacks on two hospitals in Syria which resulted in many fatalities, 
including the deaths of three children  –  Spencer Ackerman, ‘Doctors Without Borders airstrike: US alters story 
for fourth time in four days’ (The Guardian, 06/10/2015) www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/oct/06/doctors-without-borders-airstrike-afghanistan-us-account-changes-again, Accessed: 
15/06/2016 
3 Part 4 of the UK Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 allowed the indefinite detention of suspected 
international terrorist suspects without charge if they could not be deported from the country, before being 
rebuked by the House of Lords in 2004 
4 Cohen (1991) in Lisa Hajjar (2009) Does Torture Work? A Sociolegal Assessment of the Practice in Historical 
and Global Perspective’ 5(3) Annual Review of Law and Social Science 11, 312 
5 Oren Gross (2007) ‘Torture and an Ethics of Responsibility’, 3 Law, Culture and the Humanities 35, 35 
6 John Alan Cohan (2006-2007) ‘Torture and the Necessity Doctrine’ 41 Valparaiso University Law Review 1587, 
1588 
Bush’s infamous speech in which he declared his ‘war on terror’7 has arguably become 
synonymous as the moment torture became a more ‘acceptable’ practise. More recently, newly-
elected President of the United States Donald Trump stated that he believes that waterboarding 
‘absolutely works’ and that ‘we have to fight fire with fire.’ The justification for his positive 
stance on waterboarding as an interrogation method appears to be the more recent actions of 
terror group ISIS: ‘they're chopping off the heads of our people and other people… Isis (IS) is 
doing things that nobody has ever heard of since Medieval times.’8 Nevertheless, the UK-
assisted brutality, and torture of detainees by US forces at the Abu Ghraib facility shocked the 
country, leading to further revelations of UK complicity in the US-led extraordinary rendition 
programme. With the UK being one of the US’ top intelligence-sharing partners, US counter-
terrorism initiatives can have a direct effect on the UK. Clearly this poses the question: is the 
current threat of terrorism sufficient enough to justify the complicity of torture, or the 
acceptance of information obtained by torture?  
Torture post-9/11 has been discussed abundantly in counter-terror literature, particularly after 
the Abu Ghraib revelations. The post-9/11 US torture programme clearly indicates the 
importance of such academic discussion, due in part to its controversial nature, but particularly 
because of the very real dangers to the rights of individuals, and the possible reputational 
repercussions that the involvement of torture inflicts. Whereas some academics have focused 
on hypothetically discussing the absoluteness of the torture prohibition,9 or the morality of 
torture,10 others have instead chosen to discuss possible remedies of legal torture. One of the 
                                                          
7 The New York Times, ‘President Bush's Speech on Terrorism’ (The New York Times, 06/09/2006) 
www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, Accessed: 
14/06/2016 
8 BBC News, ‘Donald Trump says he believes waterboarding works’ (BBC News, 26/01/2017) 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-38753000, Accessed: 14/02/2017 
9 Ian Turner (2011) ‘Freedom from Torture in the ‘War on Terror’: is it Absolute?’ 23(3) Terrorism and Political 
Violence 419 
10 David Luban (2005) ‘Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb’ 91 Virginia Law Review 1425; Alon Harel & 
Assaf Sharon (2008) ‘What is Really Wrong with Torture?’ 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 241  
first proposals for the re-introduction of torture within the legal system in post-9/11 discussion 
was Alan Dershowitz’s ‘torture warrants’ proposal, which was swiftly condemned by a number 
of academics including Gross,11 Strauss12 and Allhoff.13 Despite this, other proposals including 
‘torture lite,’ and the use of a defence to torture such as necessity,14 were also bolstered as a 
more palatable forms of torture law. The most infamous scenario for which torture is justified 
is the ‘ticking bomb’, with the debate being split between those that believe the threat of the 
ticking bomb scenario is real,15 and those that believe it will almost certainly never occur.16 
The current alleged use of torture and the alleged complicity of other States means that despite 
(or perhaps because of) the lack of consensus on torture law proposals, the discussion around 
it is still very important.  
This thesis will take a different approach to that of the prevailing academic discussion on the 
use of torture, and will instead focus on State complicity in the use of torture for the purpose 
of gaining information. State complicity in torture has not attracted a great deal of academic 
fanfare in the torture debate. Although there has been plenty of thought given to the validity 
and the effectiveness of these proposals, this thesis aims to determine if any of these previous 
proposals for the direct use of torture would work in the context of assistance in the use of 
torture, or the acceptance of information from foreign agencies.  
This will be split between the moral concerns of accepting ‘fruit from the poisonous tree’, and 
how, if at all, these proposals would work within the current legal framework. Although many 
                                                          
11 Oren Gross (2004) ‘Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience’ 
University of Minnesota Law School, Research Paper No.04-6 
12 Marcy Strauss (2005) ‘The Lessons of Abu Ghraib’ 66 Ohio State Law Journal 1269 
13 Fritz Allhoff (2012-2013) ‘Torture Warrants, Self-Defense and Necessity’ 11 Cardozo Public Law Policy & 
Ethics Journal 421 
14 John T. Parry (2008) ‘Torture Warrants and the Rule of Law’ 71 Albany Law Review 885 
15 Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge, Yale 
University Press: London, 2003 
16 Chanterelle Sung (2003) ‘Torturing the Ticking Bomb Terrorist: An Analysis of Judicially Sanctioned Torture in 
the Context of Terrorism’ 23 Boston College Third World Law Journal 193; Henry Shue (2005-2006) ‘Torture in 
Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb’ 37 Case Western Reserve Journal International Law 231 
different proposals and ideas have circulated, there has not yet been a compromise between 
those that refute the idea of torture ever again being legally justified, and those that insist that, 
although undesirable, the current terror threat insists that such measures are a necessity. This 
thesis will therefore revisit some of the previous concerns and justifications used within the 
torture debate, but propose those concerns to complicity.  
What appears to be missing thus far in the torture debate is a detailed discussion that is focused 
on the legal issues and principles of complicity in torture, including - but not restricted to - 
extraordinary rendition, and the exchange of information within intelligence circles that may 
have been procured from torture. Assessing how previous proposals of the use of torture would 
work in the context of being complicit, and assisting in the act of torture, poses a further 
question: could the assistance of torture, or the acceptance of information obtained by torture, 
be accountable? This question is not concerned with discussing the legality of torture, but 
assessing whether those that use or assist in using torture within a legal framework would be 
accountable in practise. 
For many years there has been theoretical discussion as to the effectiveness of torture as a way 
of obtaining accurate information, and much of this discussion appears to conclude that 
information obtained by torture, in and of itself, cannot be trusted. However, would information 
obtained by torture enhance current methods of intelligence collection and aid counter-
terrorism? Of course, this question cannot be answered by simply assessing the effectiveness 
of the information gleaned by torture. This question also needs to consider how this information 
would improve upon other methods of intelligence collection. Examining current methods of 
intelligence collection, and the ways in which intelligence can be communicated between 
States, would allow discussion of how information acquired by torture or complicity would 
give intelligence agencies useable intelligence that they would otherwise not be able to acquire. 
The first chapter of this thesis will begin by discussing the threat posed by international 
terrorism both at home and abroad, so as to establish how severe the threat of terrorism is. It 
will then analyse the different methods of communication and intelligence exchange between 
foreign agencies, which will demonstrate how the information pertaining from torture can 
unwittingly spread from State to State. This will develop into a discussion of different forms 
of intelligence collection, focusing on methods of electronic surveillance (SIGINT) and human 
intelligence (HUMINT), whilst also analysing the effectiveness of current collection methods 
in counter-terrorism.  Lastly, it will examine the uses of intelligence, namely operational, 
evidential and anti-terror measures, to further identify the potential issues the strict prohibition 
of torture can cause in countering terrorism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE – ISSUES AFFECTING INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCIES 
 
The Terrorist Threat 
Assessing the terrorist threat is important for the State and their intelligence agencies, because 
failing to accurately calculate the risk terror groups pose could potentially result in the 
successful execution of an attack, where innocents lose their lives. Hence the State has imposed 
various legislative measures that enable the police, the military, and intelligence services to 
counter the threat that terrorism poses. The 9/11 attacks could almost be seen as the catalyst to 
numerous counter-terrorism measures in various States, including the US extraordinary 
rendition programme.  Despite extensive counter-terrorism tactics employed by the UK, the 
UK’s current terrorism threat is currently set as ‘severe’, meaning the likelihood of an attack 
is judged high,17 with a particular threat from Islamic extremism. It has been estimated that 
more than 40 terrorist plots have been prevented by British security services since 7/7.18 In 
November 2015 it was alleged that MI5 had foiled at least 7 planned terrorist attacks in the UK 
in the previous 12 months alone.19 In 2014 there was 32,685 terror-related deaths across the 
globe, up from 18,111 the year before.20 This shows that despite current efforts to counter the 
threat, terrorism is still escalating at an extraordinary rate.   
                                                          
17 Mi5 Security Service, ‘Threat Levels’, www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism/threat-levels.html, 
accessed: 13/07/2015 
18Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, ‘Theresa May: British security services foiled 40 terror plots since 7/7 attacks’ 
(The Independent, 24/11/2014) www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/theresa-may-british-security-
services-foiled-40-terror-plots-since-77-attacks-9879712.html, accessed: 13/07/2015 
19 Matt Dathan, ‘UK terror plot foiled by spies in the last three weeks’ (The Independent, 16/11/2015) 
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/spies-foiled-a-uk-terror-plot-in-the-last-three-weeks-
a6736286.html, Accessed: 22/11/2015 
20 Global Terrorism Index, 2015, Institute for Economics & Peace, Available: www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf, page 9 
Some of the most commonly known Islamic extremist groups include Al Qaeda, Al-Shaabab, 
Boko Haram, and most recently the Islamic State (ISIS). Some of the tactics these groups 
employ have previously included the use of explosives, firearms, or other handheld weapons 
such as knives, to kill and injure as many people as possible. Targets may include famous 
landmarks (such as 9/11), government buildings and aircraft, but attacks are almost always 
staged in busy areas of public use, such as a high-street, or typical holiday destinations popular 
with Western tourists, such as Tunisia or Egypt. It has been suggested by Cole that terrorist 
groups with a religious ideology (such as Islamic extremists) aim for such large-scale 
devastation, not only because the act itself is religiously legitimized, but because they want to 
demonstrate the ‘wrath of God’.21 Religious texts have been quoted out of context to justify 
such atrocities as ‘duty’, a tactic used by both Islamic and some right-wing Christian groups in 
the US.22 
Al-Qaida is most infamous for the coordinated attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 
2001, and for the ‘7/7’ attacks on the London transport system in 2005.23 Despite the death of 
its leader in 2011,24 and the emergence of ISIS in the wake of Syrian unrest, al-Qaida still poses 
a threat to the UK and elsewhere.25 Boko Haram has been named as the world’s deadliest 
terrorist organisation, responsible for over 15,000 deaths between 2009 and 2015.26 It renamed 
itself the ‘Islamic State’s West Africa Province’ in March 2015, in a show of solidarity with 
                                                          
21 Benjamin Cole, The Changing Face of Terrorism: How Real Is the Threat from Biological, Chemical and 
Nuclear Weapons?, I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd: New York, 2011, 114 
22 Benjamin Cole, The Changing Face of Terrorism: How Real Is the Threat from Biological, Chemical and 
Nuclear Weapons?, I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd: New York, 2011, 115 - 119 
23 BBC News, ‘7 July London bombings: What happened that day?’ (BBC News, 03/07/2015) 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33253598, Accessed: 23/11/2015 
24 BBC News, ‘Osama Bin Laden, al-Qaeda leader, dead - Barack Obama’ BBC News (02/05/2011) 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13256676, Accessed: 23/11/2015 
25 Hardeep Matharu, ‘Isis planning ‘mass casualty’ terror attacks in UK, head of MI5 warns’ (The Independent, 
30/11/2015) www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/isis-planning-mass-casualty-terror-attacks-in-britain-head-of-
mi5-warns-a6712946.html, Accessed: 29/10/2015 
26 Dionne Searcey, ‘Boko Haram Ranked Ahead of ISIS for Deadliest Terror Group’ (The New York Times, 
18/11/2015) www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/africa/boko-haram-ranked-ahead-of-isis-for-deadliest-
terror-group.html?_r=0, Accessed: 20/11/2015 
ISIS with whom it has now affiliated itself with.27 Despite the main focus of Boko Haram being 
the introduction of a certain form of Islam in Nigeria, its recent alliance with ISIS makes them 
a potential threat to Western interests. The current disruption in Syria and Iraq has allowed 
ISIS to flourish, gaining swathes of territory within both countries.28  
Subsequently, it has been assessed that at present there is now a three-dimensional threat – at 
home, abroad, and online.29 Though an attack within the UK and abroad is and has always been 
a threat to the population, the threat of a cyber-attack is a relatively new concept that has 
emerged with the internet age.30 Cyberterrorism may be defined as ‘deliberate actions to alter, 
disrupt, deny, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems and services’31 that results in 
non-virtual harm that has a significant effect in the real world.32 The use of automated systems 
control various aspects of everyday life, including banking, transport and healthcare – even an 
individual’s smartphone or smart TV is vulnerable, where it can be manipulated into a 
microphone,33 for example. A cyber-attack on any of these aspects, although not a direct form 
of physical harm, is a significant threat to critical infrastructure. One of the aims of former al-
Qaida leader Osama Bin Laden was to affect the economic stability of its enemies (such as the 
US), its targets being primarily State-owned facilities, the idea being that if the State is 
financially drained, they are less able to defend themselves from whatever attack is posed on it 
                                                          
27 Global Terrorism Index, 2015, Institute for Economics & Peace, Available: 
http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf, page 2 
28 BBC News, ‘What is 'Islamic State'?’ (BBC News, 14/11/2015) www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
29052144, Accessed: 23/11/2015 
29 Hardeep Matharu, ‘Isis planning ‘mass casualty’ terror attacks in UK, head of MI5 warns’ (The Independent, 
30/11/2015) www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/isis-planning-mass-casualty-terror-attacks-in-britain-head-of-
mi5-warns-a6712946.html, Accessed: 29/10/2015 
30 Terrorism Act 2001, section 1(2)(e) includes this within its definition of terrorism and is where action ‘is 
designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system’ 
31 Martin Rudner, ‘Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An Intelligence Challenge’ [2013] 26(3) 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 453, 454 
32 Lee Jarvis & Stuart Macdonald, ‘What Is Cyberterrorism? Findings From a Survey of Researchers’ [2015] 
27(4) Terrorism and Political Violence 657, 660 
33 Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘Could Isis’s ‘cyber caliphate’ unleash a deadly attack on key targets?’ (The 
Guardian, 12/04/2015) www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/12/isis-cyber-caliphate-hacking-technology-
arms-race, Accessed: 30/01/2016 
next.34 Vulnerable aspects include, but are not limited to, online financial services, transport, 
government facilities and energy firms.35 Energy and utility facilities are a target because it is 
possible to restrict energy supply,36 whilst transport systems are similarly vulnerable because 
transportation signals have the potential to be manipulated.37 Furthermore, a lot of people and 
corporations now store a considerable amount of sensitive information online, particularly 
financially-related information, which may also be subject to hacking.38 
Aside from using technology as a further form of attack, Islamic extremist groups are using the 
internet to spread propaganda, provide online training facilities, to recruit others to the jihadi 
cause, to provide instruction on network security and hacking, and glorifying violent acts.39 
ISIS in particular has caused concern because it appears to be much more technology-savvy 
than other Islamist extremist groups, and has been known to appeal to and recruit hackers that 
are already known to the authorities.40 Subsequently, it can only be assumed that their intention 
is to utilise their skills. Whereas current hacking manoeuvres on the social media accounts of 
US Central Military Command have been labelled as ‘vandalism,’ merely causing 
‘inconvenience,’41 that does not mean that ISIS will not attempt something more serious in the 
near future.  
                                                          
34 Martin Rudner, ‘Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An Intelligence Challenge’ [2013] 26(3) 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 453, 455 - 456 
35 Martin Rudner, ‘Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An Intelligence Challenge’ [2013] 26(3) 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 453, 455 
36 Mohamed Abomhara and Geir M. Køien, ‘Cyber Security and the Internet of Things: Vulnerabilities, Threats, 
Intruders and Attacks’ [2015] 4 Journal of Cyber Security 65, 68 
37 Martin Rudner, ‘Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An Intelligence Challenge’ [2013] 26(3) 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 453, 456 
38 Mohamed Abomhara and Geir M. Køien, ‘Cyber Security and the Internet of Things: Vulnerabilities, Threats, 
Intruders and Attacks’ [2015] 4 Journal of Cyber Security 65, 69 
39 Martin Rudner, ‘“Electronic Jihad”: The Internet as Al Qaeda's Catalyst for Global Terror’ [2016] Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157403, 3 
40 Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘Could Isis’s ‘cyber caliphate’ unleash a deadly attack on key targets?’ (The 
Guardian, 12/04/2015) www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/12/isis-cyber-caliphate-hacking-technology-
arms-race, Accessed: 30/01/2016 
41 Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘Could Isis’s ‘cyber caliphate’ unleash a deadly attack on key targets?’ (The 
Guardian, 12/04/2015) www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/12/isis-cyber-caliphate-hacking-technology-
arms-race, Accessed: 30/01/2016 
Conversely, ISIS may also stick to ‘traditional’ methods and objectives used by other terror 
groups to achieve their aim. There has been some concern over the possibility of terrorist 
groups acquiring chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear (CBRN) materials as a weapon 
to use against its adversaries - It has recently been reported for example that ISIS may have 
enough radioactive material to build a ‘dirty bomb.’42  The internet and other forms of open 
sources can be a valuable tool for terrorists wishing to obtain and manipulate CBRN materials, 
something which was previously a more specialised area of expertise.43 Clearly these 
suspicions are concerning, as the use of any CBRN materials in a highly populated city such 
as London or New York, both of which are and have already been targeted on numerous 
occasions, would be catastrophic, as it has the potential to cause an unknown number of 
fatalities. Furthermore, there would be a significant effect on the economy, and the clean-up 
after such an attack would be both lengthy and expensive.44  
Moreover, attacks on passenger aircraft are not an uncommon objective by terrorist groups due 
to their shock impact and fear that they inspire in the public. A further aim of attacks on aircraft 
is the damaging effect they perceive it can have on a State’s economy.45 In the case of 9/11, al-
Qaida ensured maximum impact by flying the planes into significant American landmarks 
whilst simultaneously killing almost 3000 people. Attacks on airlines are a continued threat, an 
example of which is the take down of a Russian flight in the Sinai Province, which was 
allegedly targeted by ISIS in October 201546 when an explosion was detonated whilst the 
                                                          
42 Adam Withnall, ‘Isis's dirty bomb: Jihadists have seized 'enough radioactive material to build their first 
WMD'’ (The Independent, 10/06/2015) www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isiss-dirty-bomb-
jihadists-have-seized-enough-radioactive-material-to-build-their-first-wmd-10309220.html, Accessed: 
31/01/2016 
43 Benjamin Cole, The Changing Face of Terrorism: How Real Is the Threat from Biological, Chemical and 
Nuclear Weapons?, I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd: New York, 2011, 34 
44 Ian Turner, ‘Human Rights and Antiterrorism: A Positive Legal Duty to Infringe Freedom from Torture?’ 
[2012] 35 Studies in Conﬂict & Terrorism 760, 761 
45 Martin Rudner, ‘Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An Intelligence Challenge’ [2013] 26(3) 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 453, 456 
46 Adam Withnall, ‘Isis releases audio message claiming it downed Russian plane in Sinai, says it will reveal 
method ‘soon’’ (The Independent, 12/11/2015) www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-
aircraft was in flight. This followed the recent admissions that Thomson airline flight dodged 
an Egyptian missile in several months earlier47. Although it was suspected to be part of a 
training exercise conducted by the Egyptian military, the incident certainly highlighted how 
vulnerable aircraft can be, particularly when flying over certain territories. Aside from the mass 
death and injury such an attack can cause if successful, it can certainly be presumed possible 
that it could have a substantial effect on tourism, and have a negative impact on the population’s 
faith that the State will keep them safe. 
It could be contended that there are two main groups that decide what constitutes a security 
threat and who a terrorist is, the first of these being the government. The government has 
control over the laws that are passed, and deciding what constitutes threats and how a terrorist 
is defined. The State has a vested interest in defining terrorism for several reasons, the main 
reason being due to the threat terrorism can have to its sovereign power, an example of which 
could include Northern Ireland and the IRA. The IRA was (and still is) considered a terrorist 
organisation due to its attacks on State officials and civilians. However, it could be suggested 
that the IRA was a threat to its (the States) power, due to its focus on the reunification and 
independence of Ireland, and because there were some that viewed the IRA less as rebels or 
terrorists, but more as to ‘freedom fighters’.48 
There are some States49 that may actually sponsor certain forms of terrorism because the 
terrorist’s aims are of benefit to the State in question. Subsequently, these States have attempted 
                                                          
releases-audio-message-claiming-it-downed-russian-plane-in-sinai-and-says-it-will-reveal-method-
a6720696.html, Accessed: 20/11/2015 
47 Isabelle Fraser, ‘British plane 'dodged missile above Sharm el-Sheikh' - as it happened on Friday November 6’ 
(The Telegraph, 07/11/2015) www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11981249/Russian-plane-
crash-sharm-el-sheikh-stranded-British-tourists-as-it-happened.html, Accessed: 20/11/2015 
48 BBC News ‘IRA 'freedom fighters' says MP’ (BBC News, 30/12/2001) 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/1733091.stm, Accessed: 26/06/2016 
49 The US for example has accused Iran of assisting Iraqi Shia militas, which resulted in the US not inviting Iran 
to the UN summit on combatting ISIS -  David Borger, ‘Iran's state sponsor of terrorism label excludes it from 
UN summit on Isis’ (The Guardian, 28/09/2015) www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/28/un-summit-isis-
iran-not-invited-state-sponsor-terrorism-label, Accessed: 16/06/2016. A further example is that of Libya’s 
to dissuade an international definition of terrorism that would include the forms of terrorism 
they sponsor.50 It could be argued that this is similar to when the US government changed its 
own definition of torture so that its ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ would not fall within 
the new definition of torture.51 Essentially, the argument could be made that States will define 
who and what is a terrorist to suit what happens to be convenient to them at the present time. 
It is however disputable that the State is the most influential, as the State takes advice on 
security threats from the second group, the intelligence agencies. It is arguable that it is in the 
interest of intelligence agencies to inflate the current threats to national security, firstly because 
the government will make more funding available when the threat is higher, and secondly 
because the State will pass laws that make it easier for intelligence agencies to collect 
information i.e. the Investigatory Powers Bill, otherwise known as the ‘snoopers charter.’52  
 
Intelligence Cooperation 
Modern intelligence cooperation originally began with the Cold War, and other intelligence 
networks emerging after the fall of the Soviet Union.53 The main reason intelligence agencies 
began cooperating within networks is because of the increase of organised crime spanning 
                                                          
alleged support of the IRA, which allegedly resulted in the 1987 Enniskillen bomb massacre – Henry McDonald, 
‘Gadaffi sued by 160 victims of IRA’ (The Guardian, 23/04/2006) 
www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/apr/23/uk.northernireland, Accessed: 16/06/2016 
50 Boaz Ganor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom Fighter?’ [2002] 3(4) Police 
Practice and Research 287, 288 
51 The US appeared to narrow its definition of torture so that only acts where “serious physical injury, such as 
organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death,” or mental pain that resulted in “significant 
psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.” Heather MacDonald, ‘How 
to Interrogate Terrorists’, Karen Greenberg (ed), The Torture Debate in America, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, pages 84 - 97, 93 
52 The Investigatory Powers Bill was criticised by Amnesty International, who likened the bill to ‘mass 
surveillance.’ – Amnesty International, ‘Urgent: Stop the new Snooper’s Charter annihilating our rights’ 
(Amnesty International, 11/03/2016) www.amnesty.org.uk/blogs/yes-minister-it-human-rights-issue/urgent-
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across borders,54 exemplified by modern terrorist methods since 9/11. The relationships formed 
by intelligence services are often very complicated, with a single agency potentially having 
hundreds of intelligence-sharing agreements globally at any one time.55 Intelligence agencies 
can gain huge benefits by creating international arrangements via liaisons, groups or ‘clubs’ 
with other foreign agencies. These alliances can be multilateral, plurilateral or bilateral.  
A multilateral alliance is a formal arrangement between close allies, who together share the 
responsibilities of operational duties, whilst sharing in full the intelligence gained from such 
duties.56 An example of a multilateral arrangement is the UKUSA agreement formed by the 
UK and the US in the face of the Cold War. Australia, Canada and New Zealand, who joined 
at a later date, could be referred to as ‘secondary partners’, and it is suggested that there are 
other States that have bilateral arrangements with the UK/US, that may therefore be considered 
‘third partners’. Whereas the first and second parties have quite a close relationship to one 
another in terms of available resources, third partners are limited in what they can derive from 
the arrangement. The agreement began life in 1945 so as to continue SIGINT collaboration, 
yet the UKUSA Security Agreement was only formally agreed in 1948.  It is now suggested 
that the respective agencies that act out this agreement for both the UK and the US are the 
Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) and the National Security (NSA). The 
main partners are discouraged from collecting general intelligence on each other, and to instead 
work together to collect intelligence on shared targets. The ‘five eyes’ share their resources, 
and one will often be stronger at a certain aspect of intelligence collection than the others – the 
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US for example is known for having a large security budget (one of the largest in the world).57 
A further example of a multilateral arrangement is the European Alliance initiated by France, 
whose partners include Germany and Italy.58  
A plurilateral arrangement is less formal than multilateral arrangements and typically shares 
intelligence through groups and ‘clubs’. These arrangements may involve a large number of 
allies whose relationships are not particularly close or strong, resulting in a more wary 
exchange of information limited to a focus on common threats.59 A bilateral arrangement is 
also a form of liaison less formal than a multilateral agreement, and are considered to be the 
most beneficial of the three main liaison types.60 They can be set up either formally, via a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) or by the less formal verbal agreement.61 They are 
concerned with the regular exchange of raw information relating to specific threats,62 whilst 
sharing training facilities and operational duties.63  
A liaison agreement is often made between allied States to exchange information that relates 
specifically to the allied States national security. There are several different types of these 
liaisons, including symmetrical, asymmetrical, and adversarial. A symmetrical liaison is most 
simply described as a relationship between two agencies where information is traded equally 
between the two – they are in essence ‘balanced’ exchanges. Conversely, an asymmetrical 
liaison is where one agency benefits more from the relationship than the other, resulting in an 
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unbalanced arrangement. A liaison may be considered adversarial when the agreement between 
the involved parties involves the treachery of other State partners, or when an asymmetrical 
liaison is ‘forced’ upon one or both parties. This could happen when States make an agreement 
because there is a need for political or military expectation/symmetry between the States, and 
intelligence collection is more of a secondary intention.  
Liaisons can also be simple or complex. An example of a simple liaison could be where State 
(A) will share a method of data collection with State (B), in exchange for State (B) sharing an 
alternative method of data collection with State (A) – data for data. A complex liaison could 
be where State (A) will share intelligence or a data collection method with State (B), in 
exchange for political, military, intelligence, or any mixture of favours.64 Although more than 
two States can be privy to a liaison arrangement, the value of the arrangement itself decreases 
when there are too many States involved. This is firstly because the worth of the exchange is 
dependent on the State that is least trustworthy, and secondly because it is difficult to keep the 
necessary element of secrecy when there are so many parties.65 The secrecy of its methods and 
capabilities is a strong characteristic within an intelligence agencies cooperation practises, even 
with States it considers its allies or ‘friends’: “intelligence communities of even friendly 
countries tend to be… secretive… lest disclosure militate against any future strategic 
requirement or operational tasking.”66 In 2010, the Court of Appeal ordered the release of 
documentation detailing the UK involvement in the torture of Guantanamo Bay detainee 
Binyam Mohamed,67 despite objections from the Foreign Secretary that the release of the 
information would be contrary to the ‘control principle,’ that intelligence-allied States rely on 
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to keep intelligence secret.68 Cases like this can cause friction between allied States because 
there is the possibility that a States intelligence methods may be revealed. 
Strategy is an important factor in intelligence cooperation because an agency may struggle to 
create a sharing arrangement if the agency has nothing to ‘bargain’ with – if all its secrets are 
known, what does it have to persuade States to part with their information? It is these situations 
in which a State may find itself in the position where the only thing it has to exchange is 
political favours, which may be considered the unfavourable option. Intelligence agencies may 
seek to ensure that information exchanged with a second agency remains secret via two ways 
– firstly by only exchanging information on a ‘need-to-know’ basis, and secondly by ‘user 
control’, where the information remains the property of the one that gave the information, not 
the one that receives it.69 
The most common form of intelligence sharing is done via a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU), commonly used within formal bilateral arrangements70 which do not require State or 
minister approval. Other flexible agreements made may be based upon personal relationships71: 
“Generally speaking, they govern information exchanges in the absence of an MOU, supplant 
existing MOUs, and characterize ad hoc contacts during crises. Frequently operating below 
the level of official control, informal cooperative arrangements also allow contact even when 
interaction with a certain intelligence agency (or state) is officially disfavoured.”72 Although 
there are occasions where Heads of States specifically create intelligence-sharing arrangements 
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with other states73, the most famous of which is the agreement between the UKUSA, this is in 
itself unusual and highly secret. Because communications do not require official approval, it 
can make it very difficult to regulate where that information has originated.  
Therefore, it is perhaps preferable that although the lack of structure for intelligence agencies 
can in some cases be an advantage, the communications themselves are not subject to legal 
accountability, which could prove to be a hindrance at a later date, particularly considering the 
cross-breed of intelligence and evidence that information can be. Although this may not be 
such an issue for intelligence purposes, it could prove problematic if such information was to 
later be used as evidence in a Court, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
However one of the biggest advantages to such a relaxed system is that intelligence networks 
are transgovernmental, meaning that those involved have specialist knowledge, as opposed to 
ministers.74 This can be advantageous because ministers and heads of State are not (necessarily) 
experts in national security, neither are they specially trained to filter intelligence, collect 
intelligence, or assess the threat to the State – that’s what intelligence officials are trained to 
do and should therefore, arguably, be able to do their job without an untrained minister 
officiating their work.  
Although sharing arrangements can be advantageous, they do have their limitations. The threat 
of Islamic extremism has united many States, however individual States also have domestic 
threats to contend with – In the UK for example, 18% of MI5 resources are spent on countering 
terrorism relating to Northern Ireland.75 Additionally, a State may perceive the threat 
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differently to another.76 Moreover, a State’s sharing partners may be less experienced, reducing 
the quality of information - The UK is experienced in terrorist related intelligence collection 
after dealing with more than 30 years of IRA related movement, which puts its counter-terror 
experience ahead of other States, such as the US, one of its top sharing partners.77 However, 
arrangements are potentially at their most problematic when a States intelligence agencies 
create arrangements with foreign agencies from States that have an undesirable history with 
the abuse of human rights, which can have a direct impact on the information that is exchanged 
between them.78 The current UK Prime Minister David Cameron addressed relationships with 
States that have an uncomfortable human rights reputation in an interview with Channel 4 
News, where he was questioned over the UK’s seemingly close relationship with Saudi Arabia, 
known for its oppressive regime. David Cameron claimed that: 
“We have a relationship with Saudi Arabia… because we receive from them important 
intelligence and security information that keeps us safe. The reason we have the 
relationship is our own national security. There was one occasion since I’ve been prime 
minister where a bomb that would have potentially blown up over Britain was stopped 
because of intelligence we got from Saudi Arabia… it would be easier for me to say: ‘I’m 
not having anything to do with these people’… For me, Britain’s national security and 
our people’s security comes first.”79   
There is current academic discussion over the apparent ‘conflict’ between human rights and 
national security in the context of counter-terrorism - After all, ‘it is the ﬁrst responsibility of 
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government in a democratic society to protect and safeguard the lives of its citizens.’80 It would 
appear however that the State has been using this argument to sacrifice certain human rights 
and justify the prioritisation of national security. Conversely, Feinberg appears to question why 
there is a conflict at all, suggesting that State lawmakers and authorities have assumed that one 
must be placed above the other, and have therefore prioritised security.81 David Cameron’s 
words to Channel 4 certainly seems to correspond with Feinberg’s thoughts. It could be argued 
that prioritising national security over individual freedoms is an odd position for a State to take 
considering that national security and the counter-terrorism effort is about keeping people safe 
from harm and protecting their human rights. To then potentially sanction the abuse of human 
rights, in the name of protecting its citizens (i.e. national security) seems peculiar. 
Subsequently, arrangements with foreign States that are known for limiting individual 
freedoms appears to be one of the ways that British officials have directly or indirectly become 
involved in the use of torture, and have intentionally or unintentionally received information 
that has been obtained by torture. David Cameron is not the first UK Prime Minister to oversee 
close ties with a State known for human rights abuses. In early 2015, it came to light that both 
MI5 & MI6 had close ties with Libya’s Colonel Gaddaffi under former UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair’s government in 2006 and 200782. In papers found during the Libyan revolution by 
the Human Rights Watch in 2011, it is alleged that ‘UK intelligence agencies sent more than 
1,600 questions to be put to the two opposition leaders, Sami al-Saadi and Abdul Hakim Belhaj, 
despite having reason to suspect they were being tortured.’83 It was also alleged from these 
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documents that ‘Five men were subjected to control orders in the UK, allegedly on the basis of 
information extracted from two rendition victims.’84 This eventually led to an investigation by 
the Metropolitan Police called Operation Lydd, aimed at discerning MI6’s involvement with 
the CIA in the alleged rendition of Abdul Hakin Balhaj and his wife, and the use of Diego 
Garcia as a site for a secret prison.85 Despite potential problems such as the actions of partners 
States affecting the collection and use of shared intelligence (as above), liaisons can have huge 
advantages. Because terrorism is far-reaching across a number of different States, having a 
number of intelligence partners in States that terrorists are based in, that speak the same 
language and better know the terrain, can be incredibly beneficial86. Furthermore, having a high 
number of partnerships can also relieve strain on an agencies financial budget and resources, 
allowing each State to direct its focus, as opposed to trying to balance a large number of 
individual projects across various operational disciplines.  
 
How is Intelligence Collected? 
Aside from inter-governmental agreements, the UK has its own methods of intelligence 
collection – similarly, each State has its own methods of intelligence collection, working within 
their own strengths and budget capabilities. This is because no State has the financial means to 
pursue every strategy, hence the exchange of information with other States is as important. It 
could be suggested that this likely adds extra pressure on personnel to obtain important 
information. The UK government for example would seek information that would be useful to 
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others States, such as the US, because we have a close relationship with US intelligence 
services, and would like to continue the exchange for information that may prove important to 
UK interests. 
One of the most obvious ways of collecting information is through various forms of SIGINT, 
which can most prove useful in tracing the finances of terror organisations and recording its 
communications. Communications can be monitored by ‘wiretapping’, where the exchanges 
between a limited number of individuals can be captured, or ‘metadata’ which is the large-scale 
collection of records from Telephone providers87. Documents exposed by former CIA 
employee Edward Snowden in 2013 suggest that both the National Security Agency (NSA) 
and GCHQ had extensive surveillance programmes producing vast amounts of data88. The 
surveillance programme created in 2007 was known as Prism, and allowed the NSA to gain 
huge amounts of data (such as emails and login-in details) from a number of social media 
sites.89 In addition to Prism, the NSA also had a court ordered arrangement with a 
telecommunications company called Verizon, whereby it had to transfer all its data to the 
NSA.90 GCHQ had its own operation known as Tempora, which obtained internet and 
telephone communications by monitoring fibre optic cables.91 From these revelations it is safe 
to assume that surveillance is a significant and far-reaching tool for an intelligence agency in 
collecting information. SIGINT has had a more important role in the years previous to 9/11, 
when other tools, such as interrogation and the acquisition of documents, were less evolved. 
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Subsequently, its use has since decreased.92 The main disadvantage to SIGINT is that terrorists 
are aware of its use, and therefore enact counter-measures to avoid falling into its detection.93  
There are several forms that HUMINT can take, including human spies, document exploitation 
and interrogation.94 The use of ‘human spies’ is where a person involves themselves with the 
targeted person/group, and reports any useful information or documentation they gain back to 
their agency.95 The idea is that they will remain in this position for as long as possible, or as 
long as they are needed to be, hence any information they report will be guarded so as not to 
arouse the suspicion of the target/s.96 Because of this, it can be presumed that the quality of 
information they have access to will increase overtime. However, the use of spies in counter-
terrorism poses challenges to this traditional method, because if the spy was to find out about 
an imminent terrorist plot, intelligence officials may have to expose the information so as to 
prevent the event from occurring.97 In addition, terrorist groups may be based in countries that 
speak a different language or have a different ethnic profile, which may be difficult for an 
agency in the recruitment of local informants or ‘assets’ that are not based in that State. 
However, this can possibly be solved by the use of ‘diversified cover officers’ who may be 
more likely to mimic the ethnic profile needed to fit in more conspicuously.98  Subsequently, 
its use can be potentially limiting, hence other forms of HUMINT and SIGINT are considered 
needed to fill in the gaps. 
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A further method of HUMINT is document exploitation (DocEx). Larger terrorist groups, 
despite their best efforts, leave a paper trail, detailing its training records, communications with 
its members, organising plans for future actions etc.99 Obtaining these documents may occur 
when the State causes some sort of disruption to an organisation e.g. a raid, and clear out an 
documental evidence that is left behind, including computer files, photographs, and mobile 
phones.100 This type of intelligence can prove most useful in understanding how the 
organisation works and communicates with itself.101 The biggest issue with DocEx, is that this 
sort of information will not be available on a regular occurrence. Furthermore, although this 
type of intelligence can be useful for larger terrorist groups, it is perhaps not particularly useful 
when it concerns ‘lone wolf’102 terrorists, because by the time this type of information becomes 
available, the damage may already be done.  
Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) however, might prove itself to be useful in identifying 
lone wolves. SOCMINT is another form of SIGINT,103 which involves the analysis of social 
media accounts such as Facebook and Twitter (amongst others) that have become popular in 
recent years, even amongst terrorist organisations such as ISIS or Al Shabaab.104 People and 
locations can be identified quickly, with intelligence agencies and the police being immediately 
informed of any unfolding events.105 For example, if an individual was to express an interest 
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and/or comment on terror-related media, this person could be identified as a possibly threat and 
further action could be taken if deemed necessary.  
Another method of HUMINT is interrogation, the use of which has grown since 9/11. 
Interrogation can be carried out by intelligence officials, military personnel or the police, often 
in prison or detention facilities, as has been the case with Guantanamo Bay and at Ballykelly 
airfield.106 The interrogation of those affiliated with a terrorist group is clearly an important 
tool for intelligence officials because of the quality of information that can be gained: personal 
details of other terrorist members, locations of training facilities, financial details, and future 
attacks etc.107 Furthermore, the capture and detention of the member of a terrorist organisation 
can have a significant effect on the efficiency of the group as a whole, as the group will 
concentrate their efforts into protecting themselves against any information the captured 
member may reveal.108 On the other hand, the disruption of terrorist activities presents the 
possibility of an unexpected attack, presumably so that they can achieve their aim before they 
are further interrupted. An example of this is the recent attack in Brussels, where two suicide 
bombers affiliated with ISIS carried out simultaneous attacks shortly after the arrest of ISIS 
militant Salah Abdeslam.109 However, interrogation, much like other forms of HUMINT, 
cannot be used without the prior assistance of other forms of intelligence, such as SIGINT. 
Additionally, intelligence gained by interrogation is debatably the most unreliable, the main 
reason for this being that the person being interrogated can be untruthful. Although the 
information they give could be independently verified through other methods, it wastes time 
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and resources that could be put to better use. Aside from being untruthful, the detainee can be 
unresponsive and/or refuse to confirm or answer anything asked or stated by the 
interrogator/s.110  
 
How Is Intelligence Used? 
The ultimate aim of counter-terrorist intelligence efforts introduced by the government, is to 
reduce the terrorist threat and to prevent a terrorist attack from happening. In turn, this ‘means 
detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible stage, disrupting terrorist activity 
before it can endanger the public and, wherever possible, prosecuting those responsible.’111 
The UK government introduced a number of measures designed specifically to deter terrorism 
in the wake of 9/11. These measures include the proscription of terrorist groups, the revocation 
of British citizenship for those involved in the planning or encouragement of terrorist acts, the 
deportation of ‘hate preachers’ who encourage terrorist acts112 and Control Orders/Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). Control orders were introduced by the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005,113 and were designed to restrict suspects and watch their 
movements, with methods including electronic tagging, limiting communication methods and 
recipients, restricting suspect movements, and initiating curfews.114 Control orders were 
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replaced by TPIMs in 2012, and were of particular concern due to the apparently low standard 
of proof needed for the Secretary of State to impose such a liberty-depriving decision on an 
individual.115 TPIMs were supposed to be ‘fairer’ than control orders, but supposedly still 
contain similar provisions, with human rights organisation Liberty referring to them as 
‘control-order lite.’116 Furthermore, intelligence can been used to inspire de-radicalization 
initiatives such (as the Channel Programme),117 further cooperation with foreign agencies, and 
assist military intervention. 
The UK and the US have different aims and approaches to counter-terrorism strategy, which 
can be useful because both States have a different perspective, therefore a different outcome. 
However, having these different aims can also frustrate investigation: ‘The simplest differences 
can often be the most instructive. ‘Frustrating terrorism’ versus ‘defeating terrorism’ captures 
the core differences present in the respective UK and US approaches to addressing 
terrorism.’118 There are two key differences in approach when it comes to counter-terrorism, 
the main two being law enforcement and military. Law enforcement is more of an observation 
and investigative method, whereas the disruption of activities is more militarized. Previous 
military intervention of terrorist activity includes the case of Operation Flavius, where in 1988 
British intelligence services became aware of a plot by the IRA to commit terrorist activity in 
Gibraltar. In response to this, SAS soldiers intended to arrest the suspects before they managed 
to carry out their plans, which actually resulted in shooting all three suspects dead.119 A further 
example is the 2011 military operation launched by the US to kill Osama Bin Laden in his 
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home compound in Pakistan120. Although both enforcement and the military are needed for 
effective counter-terrorism stratagem, there are tensions between the two due to the timing of 
the methods. Essentially, it is watch (law enforcement) versus act (military).121 The UK takes 
more of a frustrate approach to terrorism, whereas the US tends to view terrorism as a war, 
hence their approach is more militarized than the UK122.  
Intelligence can be used in two main forms: to prevent an incident from happening (priori) or 
as part of a post-incident investigation (post facto)123. In simpler terms, the first port of call for 
intelligence is to frustrate the terrorist effort by interrupting their plans. This may include using 
intelligence to detain a suspect – this creates a problem for a terrorist group because they must 
assume that anything the detainee knows, the interrogators now know, and must thus funnel 
their energies into covering their tracks124. Furthermore, SIGINT intelligence has been used to 
‘geolocate’ terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden, and has also been used to track their financial 
assets.125 Additionally, intelligence can inform the State, authorities and the public of safety 
measures they should take so as to prevent attacks. An example of this is ‘Operation Overt’, 
where security services found a plot to create liquid bombs that looked like soft drinks, with 
the likely targets being passenger planes. Consequently, aviation authorities across the globe 
were able to close the security flaw, which further frustrated the terrorism effort.126 This may 
only be truly effective if the people committing acts of terrorism are closely/personally 
affiliated with a terrorist group, however in 2014 70% of terrorist offences committed were 
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committed by ‘lone wolf’ terrorists,127 presumably one of the effects of an increased social 
media platform, which terrorist groups now use to ‘inspire’ individuals to commit their own 
attacks. Nevertheless, with 3 in 10 terror attacks committed directly by members of a larger 
terrorist cell, this will still be one of the main aims of intelligence collection. Lone wolves are 
potentially more difficult because without affiliation with a terrorist group, they may not appear 
on the radar until it’s too late.  
Conviction of terrorist offences carry hefty penalties worldwide due to their seriousness – In 
the UK for example, the preparation of terrorist acts carries a maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment.128 The conviction of an individual is one of the most effective ways of 
preventing terrorist related offences, first and foremost because they are physically incapable 
of carrying out an attack, because they do not have access to the materials, facilities, 
communications or locations needed to effectively plan or carry out an attack. Furthermore, the 
ability of the perpetrator to encourage, assist, or facilitate anybody else to commit such an 
offence is also reduced if they are subject to incarceration, with limits on their access to the 
internet. 
However, a conviction after the fact could be considered less useful, partially because the 
damage has been done, but mostly because due to the emergence of the suicide bomber, the 
main perpetrators of the offence may die as part of the attack. Of course that is not always the 
case, an example of which being Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, one of the Boston bombers who was 
convicted for his part in the 2013 attack.129 Furthermore, conviction can still be useful 
regardless of whether the main perpetrators are killed, as they often have co-conspirators that 
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have encouraged or assisted before or after the attack – Even in the case of lone wolves, as also 
shown in the Boston bombers case.130 Hence, post-attack conviction can still be useful in 
frustrating the terrorist effort, but is not immediately beneficial in directly preventing an attack. 
Furthermore, an intelligence agency may find that a conviction is not the best course of action 
if they believe that they can use a terrorist suspect to become an informant. Of course, this 
comes with its own risks – the terrorist turned informant could feed back false information, 
inform other terrorists of his predicament, or even be killed if discovered to be spying.131 
Moreover, although informants are not unusual in criminal trials,132 there is a difference 
between an informant that has infiltrated a terrorist group and a genuine terrorist, the latter of 
which may not be considered a trustworthy witness in any subsequent trial that may happen as 
a result information that he/she manages to provide. However, this does not mean that 
information provided by a terrorist informant would not be useful in an internal operational 
capacity. 
Subsequently, intelligence and evidence have been increasingly thronged together, despite the 
fact that intelligence and evidence are two completely different concepts. Roach133 details the 
specific differences between evidence and intelligence, an important differentiation because 
they are traditionally completely separate entities deriving from two completely different 
institutions. Firstly, whereas both intelligence and evidence seek to find the truth, the main 
difference between the two is the purpose. Whereas evidence is concerned with the guilt of 
past events, intelligence is assessing the risk posed from events that have not even happened 
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yet: “The aim of intelligence is to identify security risks and suspect associations as opposed 
to guilty acts and minds… is subject to internal verification as opposed to the external checks 
of adversarial challenge and cross-examination.”134 The defining characteristic of intelligence 
is secrecy, because the methods and sources used by intelligence agencies need to be unknown 
to terror organisations, so that they cannot evade or otherwise frustrate such methods. 
Furthermore, information could come from foreign intelligence agencies which also need to 
keep their sources confidential.  
Conversely, evidence is carefully prepared for the examination and scrutiny of a court and the 
public. Subsequently, evidence is presented and validated by a variety of people e.g. judges, 
police officers, jury, prosecution/defence representatives etc., before it even reaches a court, 
whereas intelligence is internally validated by employees of the agencies themselves.135 
Although the use of intelligence as evidence in a criminal trial is certainly not the aim of 
intelligence, the high emphasis of intelligence collection and prosecution for terrorist offences 
since 9/11 has made it increasingly likely that intelligence and evidence collide. Terrorist-
related offences are among some of the only offences where the perpetrator can be prosecuted 
without having actually been successful in committing the crime, where the mere planning or 
encouragement of the crime is itself an offence. Hence, intelligence might be some of the only 
evidence available to ensure a successful prosecution. Although SIGINT intelligence can prove 
particularly useful as ‘solid’ evidence and proof of accountability, it can prove itself to at times 
imprecise and partial, which as a whole can make it unreliable.136  
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Moreover, intelligence agencies may be uncooperative with criminal investigation because it 
may reveal their sources and methods, thus leaving them open to scrutiny. Subsequently, 
certain measures have recently been developed to counter-act this reluctance. Closed material 
procedure (CMP) or ‘secret courts’ allows relevant information to remain secret in certain court 
proceedings, because allowing the information to be released could have a potentially 
detrimental effect on national security. The defendant is omitted from the court, and a security-
assessed ‘special advocate’ takes his place so that the defendant is still (in theory) 
represented.137 This is in contrast to the usual court procedure, in which not only does the 
defendant and his counsel have access to all evidence against him, but are also able to question 
the evidence and how it was obtained.138 CMP is used to protect intelligence sources and 
relationships with other State agencies.139 One of the issues with ‘secret courts’ is that it is 
applicable to courts not investigations, and so intelligence agencies may still remain 
uncooperative in certain aspects of institutional intrusion for fear of revealing their methods. 
This was shown in the previously mentioned case of Binyam Mohammed,140 where Mr 
Mohammed wanted the UK government to disclose some information from the US, which 
would show he had been subject to torture, to use as part of his defence in his trial in the US. 
Although the reason the UK government was reluctant to expose this information was because 
they feared it would endanger future alliances with other States, it also demonstrates how 
CMP’s can affect the ideal of open justice.141  
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The use of intelligence as evidence for a prosecution has likely become more common since 
9/11, possibly due to the emergence of so-called ‘home-grown’ terrorism, where the terrorist 
is actually a citizen of the State itself and may have never even travelled to a country known to 
house a terrorist strong-hold. According to Roach, the police have become more involved in 
counter-terrorism operations conducted by intelligence agencies,142 which would also suggest 
the possibility of intelligence becoming more involved in resulting prosecutions. An example 
of the police and intelligence service cooperation is Operation Crevice, which resulted in the 
conviction of five British men with links to Al-Qaeda for plotting to use a large fertiliser bomb 
to target numerous venues of public use.143 This can however cause problems within a trial 
setting, because intelligence has different aims to evidence. Furthermore, staff at intelligence 
agencies are not trained in how to present evidence to a Court – For example, during the 
investigation into the death of former Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) employee Gareth 
Williams, SIS/MI6 staff were criticized for withholding evidence because they themselves had 
not deemed it relevant.144 This shows that intelligence staff are potentially not well versed in 
what is appropriate evidence and what is not. Part of this problem can therefore occur due to a 
lack of knowledge in criminal law on the part of intelligence officials.145 Essentially, 
intelligence is not gathered and put together like evidence, with the aim of proving what 
someone has done or wanted to do, but is based on what someone might do. Furthermore, the 
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use of intelligence as evidence can also risk putting the burden of proof on the defendant, as 
seen in cases such as Adbelrazic v. Canada.146 
 
To conclude, this chapter has identified that the threat posed by terrorism appears to be 
increasing, with particular emphasis on cyber terrorism. Subsequently, intelligence collection 
and partnerships with foreign agencies are essential for the State in countering the threat. 
Furthermore, this chapter has established that intelligence agencies have various methods of 
information exchange, many of which can be considered ‘informal’. The result of this is that it 
can be difficult to identify the source of this information, which is a particular concern when 
exchanging information with States that have an ‘undesirable’ human rights reputation. 
Additionally, this chapter has identified that whilst various forms of SIGINT and HUMINT are 
valuable tools in countering the threat, interrogation is especially problematic. This chapter has 
identified two main objectives of intelligence use – to frustrate and prosecute. Subsequently, 
these issues are particularly problematic when intelligence agencies have to work with law 
enforcement and the judiciary, as the information collected or received is often not of the 
standard required for formal proceedings and prosecutions. The second chapter of this thesis 
will examine the current prohibition of torture, so as to determine what the prohibition is, how 
strong the prohibition is, and how the prohibition affects complicity. In turn, this will 
demonstrate how the current law on torture may affect the intelligence community’s attempts 
to counter terrorism.  
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CHAPTER TWO: The Legality of Torture and Complicity 
 
Legal Definition of Torture 
The act of torture itself is defined within section 1 UNCAT as ‘any act by which severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes 
as obtaining from him… information or a confession… when such pain or suffering is inflicted 
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.’147 In Aksoy v. Turkey148 it was considered that for an act 
to be considered torture it must be both intentional and severe in nature. For example physical 
beatings149 and rape150 constitute as torture, as do threats of violence or death. Cruel, inhumane 
and degrading treatment is not defined within UNCAT, though is prohibited under article 16(1) 
which states that ‘Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its 
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not 
amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the 
instigation151 of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity…’152 Torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment are 
differentiated in Ireland v. United Kingdom.153 In this case, it was decided that torture is 
‘deliberate, inhumane treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering’154 whereas 
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inhumane treatment is ‘treatment or punishment that causes intense physical and mental 
suffering.’155 The difference between the two appears to be the severity of the harm inflicted. 
 
The Prohibition of Torture 
There are a variety of international conventions that prohibit the use of torture. Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states that ‘No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’156  Similarly, article 5 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and article 7 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’157 The most notable convention 
prohibiting torture is the United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), which has been ratified by 159 
States.158  
All of UNCAT’s participating States are required to proactively prevent the use of torture in 
all legal and administrative means, according to Article 2(1) of UNCAT which states that ‘Each 
State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent 
acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.’159 UNCAT also compels all party States 
to systematically criminalise torture, according to Article 4(1) of UNCAT which states that 
‘Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The 
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same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes 
complicity or participation in torture.’160 Furthermore article 30 UDHR states that ‘Nothing in 
this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to 
engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein’.161 
 
The Law for Public Officials 
Article 10(1) UNCAT states that ‘Each State Party shall ensure that education and information 
regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement 
personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be 
involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of 
arrest, detention or imprisonment.’162 It could be assumed that when drafting this particular 
article of UNCAT the intention was for it to be very wide, so as to guarantee that a State cannot 
issue instructions to any State appointed personnel to invoke the use of torture. Furthermore, 
article 2(3) UNCAT which states that ‘An order from a superior officer or a public authority 
may not be invoked as a justification of torture’163 ensures that both State officials and 
personnel cannot rationalize or defend the use of torture in whatever circumstances  they may 
be presented with. Furthermore, article 10(2) states that ‘Each State Party shall include this 
prohibition in the rules or instructions issued in regard to the duties and functions of any such 
persons.’164 The UK has included these prohibitions in the Criminal Justice Act 1988165 - 
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Section 134(1) of the act states that the location of where the torture is committed and the 
nationality of the torturer are both irrelevant, providing that the person committing the 
torture166 upon another is a public official (or otherwise acting official), and uses torture whilst 
performing his official duties. Sub-section 2 of the act broadens the section further by stating 
that the offence of torture is committed where severe pain/suffering is inflicted with the 
instigation or consent of a public official. The involvement of a public official is clearly a key 
requirement of the prohibition against torture because this is what separates State torture and 
individual torture. A public official is presumably anyone involved with the investigation 
and/or prevention of terrorist offences that has some form of State authority, such as the 
military, police or an intelligence official. 
 
Complicity  
Complicity is focused on the assistance of an act, making the act possible to commit, as opposed 
to being the main offender. To be considered complicit there are several requirements: The first 
is that an illegal act is committed by one person (the principal offender) with the assistance of 
another (secondary offender), both of which must have done so through their own free will. 
The second is that the secondary offender has some knowledge of the offence, i.e. is not 
unaware that they are contributing to the offence taking place, and therefore need to be intent 
on participating in the act.167 However, the secondary actor does not need to be ‘effective’ in 
their complicity, and need only affect the act itself.168 
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The complicit actor can assist by one of two methods – either by engaging in the act with the 
principal offender or by inciting the principal offender to commit the act itself.169 For example, 
if actor A held down a person whilst actor B used a knife to kill that person, actor A becomes 
the secondary offender complicit in the murder committed by actor B, the principle offender, 
providing that the secondary actor was aware of the principal offender’s intention. If actor A 
incited actor B to commit the murder, such as by verbally encouraging/ordering them to commit 
the offence or by providing the knife, they are complicit in the murder regardless of whether 
they actively participated in the murder or not.170 Alternatively, omitting to act (and stop the 
offender) can also be viewed as encouragement, because the offender can gain confidence and 
moral support from the lack of discouragement.171 Furthermore, the presence of an individual 
that the principal offender of a crime looks up to can also be deemed as complicity. An example 
of this could be the presence of an officer at a military base – a similar scenario to the Abu 
Ghraib abuse scandal. It was alleged that when whilst the abuse was committed by military 
guards and contractors, other military personnel (such as former officer Gen Karpinski) and 
officials from the pentagon were aware of the abuse, and even appeared to encouraged it. 
Furthermore, Specialist Charles Graner Jr insisted that he was following the orders of military 
intelligence officers.172 The presence of such a person, particularly one of authority, spectating 
and not making an effort to curb such behaviour can also be viewed as encouragement for the 
principal offender.173 
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Subsequently, the issue of complicity can easily become very complicated, particularly when 
in relation to international law. UNCAT states that not only must States criminalise torture 
under its own domestic law, but that anything that constitutes complicity should be similarly 
prohibited: ‘The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person 
which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.’174 Furthermore, Art 2(3) UNCAT also 
states that ‘An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a 
justification of torture.’175 There is no complicity equivalent to UNCAT in the ECHR.176 
Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts states that ‘A State which aids or assists another State in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for 
doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.’177 
State complicity is different to individual complicity because States have a positive obligation 
to ensure that torture does not happen, hence State complicity takes on a wider meaning than 
individual complicity.178 The most persuasive reason that complicity is viewed with the same 
seriousness as the offence itself is because it enables the offence in the first place. Particularly 
in the case of torture, if the information was unusable then torture would not be used – In 
essence if you cut the demand, the trade will cease to exist. 
Applying the concept of complicity specifically to torture, there are multiple situations in which 
a State may become complicit in the use and/or production of torture evidence: Asking a State 
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known for its use of torture to question a person of interest, providing questions for the suspect 
to be asked, or sending UK official/s to question the suspect themselves before, during or after 
torture has been used on them; Where a UK official fails to certify the occurrence of torture, 
and does nothing to thwart its continued use; and accepting information from foreign States 
when failing to certify if the information has been obtained with the assistance of torture.179 
Where a State (A) communicates questions they want answers for to a foreign State, State (B), 
when State A knows or should know that State B may use torture so as to get answers to these 
questions, then this may be known as complicity by constructive knowledge, and is a violation 
of article 15 UNCAT.180 Providing a person to be tortured, a place to torture, or otherwise 
providing the tools with which to torture also constitutes complicity, because the State that 
does this both enables and encourages the State to use torture – arguably making it the most 
direct form of complicity there is. The issue of complicity could essentially be broken down to 
the intention and knowledge of State A – In a relevant scenario, State A is guilty by association 
when it knows, should know or directly intends for torture to be used upon a person for the 
purposes of intelligence gathering. However it should also be noted that accepting tainted 
information after the fact without prior involvement is not a violation of law. 
A further example of State complicity is providing information to a foreign State so that they 
may detain a person of interest, which may result in their torture, or their rendition to another 
State which does practise torture.181 Extraordinary rendition is prohibited under article 3(1) 
UNCAT which states that ‘No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person 
to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger 
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of being subjected to torture.’182 In Soering v UK,183 the claimant objected to his extradition to 
the US for the crime of murder, because his conviction could have resulted in the penalty of 
capital punishment upon his conviction. He successfully claimed that America’s ‘death row’ 
would have such an impact on his mental wellbeing that it would constitute torture under Art. 
3 ECHR. 
An example of alleged UK complicity is the case of Yunus Rahmantullah. Yunus 
Rahmantullah, a Pakistani citizen, was detained at Abu Ghraib and Bagram Airbase before 
being released without charge in 2014.184 He brought a case to the UK High Court the same 
year, alleging that UK forces had been complicit in his torture by submitting him to be rendered 
by US forces.185 The UK government claimed that the relationship between the UK and the US 
could suffer if he was allowed to claim for damages in court, which was dismissed by the 
Court.186 This raises the potential issue of whether the UK has ‘kept their hands clean’ by not 
being directly involved in torture, but by enabling other States to torture whilst obtaining the 
information they wanted.187 It could be said in this scenario that complicity in torture is the best 
of both – the State can play dumb with  clean conscience and yet still gain whatever information 
the victim has to offer. 
 
Absolute and Non-Derogable 
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Article 15(2) ECHR states that ‘No derogation… from Articles 3… shall be made under this 
provision.’188 Even in circumstances where there is the substantial threat of an imminent 
terrorist attack, or the suspect is deemed a threat to the public,‘[t]he Convention prohibits in 
absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the 
victim’s conduct… Article 3… makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is 
permissible under article 15… even in the event of a public emergency to the life of the 
nation.’189 This is further backed up by Chahal v. United Kingdom190 which states that the use 
of torture and/or inhumane or degrading treatment is absolutely prohibited under any 
circumstances. Likewise Article 2 (2) of UNCAT states that ‘No exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other 
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.’191 A State cannot justify a 
derogation from the prohibition of torture, therefore making the prohibition an absolute and 
non-derogable right. The prohibition against torture is part of customary international law and 
binds all States.192 It is also a non-derogable peremptory norm with an overriding ‘jus cogens’ 
status in international law.193 
 
Defences 
Following the events of 9/11, there has been recent academic debate over the possible use of 
defences for the use torture, mostly discussed in the context of emergency situations such as 
                                                          
188 Article 15 (2) ECHR, Available: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf, 13 
189 Chahal v. United Kingdom, in Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law (2nd Edition) Longman: 
Harlow, 2010, 191 
190 Chahal v. United Kingdom, Application no. 22414/93 
191 Article 2(2) UNCAT, available: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm 
192 Matt Pollard, ‘Rotten Fruit: State Solicitation, Acceptance and Use of Information Obtained Through Torture 
by Another State’ [2005] 23 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 349, 352 
193 Matt Pollard, ‘Rotten Fruit: State Solicitation, Acceptance and Use of Information Obtained Through Torture 
by Another State’ [2005] 23 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 349, 353 
the ‘ticking bomb’. The two main defences that are usually discussed are necessity and self-
defence, contained within the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 
31(1)(d) ICC St states that the defence of necessity is where ‘The conduct which is alleged to 
constitute a crime… has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or of 
continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person, and the 
person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the person does not 
intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.’194 This defence is concerned 
with the use of force against a person that is innocent. If that person is a suspected terrorist 
without prior conviction, then that person may be considered, in a legal sense, as an innocent. 
However, if the person does have a recent or prior conviction, then they may not be considered 
innocent. Regardless of conviction, someone suspected of terrorist offences is not someone that 
the torturer would consider to be innocent at the time the torture takes place.195 The main issue 
with this defence is that there is no guarantee that any information gained would be of any use 
to the torturer in terms of preventing an imminent emergency scenario.196 This defence will be 
further discussed in chapter four. 
Article 31(1)(c) ICC St states that the defence of self-defence is where ‘The person acts 
reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person… which is essential for the survival 
of the person or another person… against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner 
proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person.’197 Using self-defence 
as a defence to the use of torture would be problematic, because one of the key elements to this 
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defence is that the person using the torture must feel threatened by the person they are using 
torture against. However, it would be difficult to justify this, because the person being tortured 
is not specifically a threat to the person using the torture, and certainly not at the moment it 
takes place.198 
The use of either of these defences by a State or intelligence agency would be problematic, 
even in emergency scenarios, because the torture used is difficult to justify.199 This is because 
for both defences, it must be established that the force used on the person was reasonable. For 
this to be reasonable, it must be appropriate and the harm must not be greater than the threat 
posed. The torturer would need to be sure that the suspect has both the information that they 
want, and that the suspect will divulge this information if torture is used.  
 
The Exclusionary Rule 
The exclusionary rule is a term used to describe the inadmissibility of evidence obtained by 
torture within formal proceedings, and applies regardless of where the torture took place, or 
the perpetrators nationality.200 Essentially, because the act of torture itself is non-derogable and 
has no exceptions whatsoever, the use of evidence obtained by torture cannot be used regardless 
of the circumstances.201 The reason for this would appear to be two-fold. Firstly, evidence 
obtained by torture is considered infamously unreliable. Therefore, it would be extremely 
unfair for a defendant to incriminate themselves with information given under duress, when 
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such information could very well be false or misleading. Secondly it prevents those that use 
torture benefitting from such action202 – it would not be fair for a Court to accept evidence that 
was obtained through the abuse of such a fundamental human right. This is covered within 
Article 15 UNCAT which states that ‘Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which 
is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any 
proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was 
made.’203 
Article 15 UNCAT contains several components which must be clarified. The meaning of the 
word ‘established’ could initially be construed as being rather broad, however the Committee 
against Torture has adopted a reasonably restrictive approach.204 To establish the use of torture 
is quite challenging, both for the accused and the prosecution, because proving that torture has 
or has not been used in the gathering of evidence against the accused is often one word against 
the other. It becomes particularly difficult to establish when the evidence has been provided by 
a third party, namely a foreign State. The committee against Torture held in P.E. v France205 
that the applicant (i.e. the tortured) must determine that their claim has some basis, although 
the burden of proof is on the State.206 This is further confirmed in G.K. v Switzerland.207  
The phrases ‘any statement’ and ‘any proceedings’ are both very wide, therefore protecting 
this right regardless of who made the statement or what the proceedings are.208 Despite the 
Committee Against Torture often referring specifically to judicial proceedings, it is for the most 
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part considered that ‘any proceedings’ refers to any formal decision making that requires the 
involvement of State officials. There is no indication that there has been a narrow interpretation 
of this phrase, so it can only be presumed that this article is not limited to the Court or other 
judicial proceedings.209 ‘Any proceedings’ essentially refers to any (formal) proceedings in 
which the State has jurisdiction over, including for example extradition proceedings, and is not 
just limited to court proceedings.210 
Whereas article 15 UNCAT clearly applies to the use of torture, there are questions as to 
whether it also applies to the use of cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. Article 16(1) 
UNCAT states that ‘…In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 
shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.211’ This article does not mention article 15, 
which indicates that statements made as a result of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment may 
not be prohibited under article 15, unlike other articles contained within the convention.  
However in the ECHR case of Gafgen v. Germany,212 it was decided that the use of inhumane 
and degrading treatment to obtain evidence would also automatically violate the right to a fair 
trial. In this case the applicant kidnapped the 11 year old son of a wealthy family and demanded 
1 million euros in ransom from the child’s family in exchange for his safe return. The applicant 
was arrested after picking up the ransom money, but refused to disclose the location of the 
child during questioning by police. The police were under the impression that the child’s life 
was in imminent danger, and threatened the applicant with torture unless he revealed where the 
child was. The applicant gave the information for fear that the police would follow through 
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with their threats, but the child was unfortunately already dead when he was found. The 
applicant later admitted to kidnapping and killing the boy.213 The applicant claimed that the 
police officers had breached his rights under article 3 ECHR and article 6 ECHR. The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the officer’s conduct did not amount torture, but 
did amount to inhumane treatment.214 
 
The Use of Information Obtained by Torture 
Information obtained by the use of torture is often referred to as ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’, 
the idea being that such information cannot be trusted because of its origins: “if the source of 
the evidence (the tree) is tainted, then anything deriving from it (the fruit) bears the same 
flaw.”215 It appears to be one of the main principles behind the right to a fair trial, as ‘flawed’ 
evidence would not be fair to the accused. The main articles that concern the right to a fair trial 
are article 6 ECHR, article 14 ICCPR and article 15 UNCAT. These articles seek to ensure that 
any evidence or confession the accused gives that may indicate their guilt is done so of their 
own free will – i.e. that they have not been compelled to admit information because they are 
under the duress of torture. It is safe to presume that one of the main reasons for this is because 
confessions are notoriously unreliable if they have been obtained under the force of torture.216  
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The ECtHR does not specify the types of evidence that are admissible or inadmissible leaving 
national Courts to make this decision themselves, providing such decisions are in accordance 
with ECHR principles and conventions:217 
‘It is not the role of the Court to determine… whether particular types of evidence—for 
example, unlawfully obtained evidence—may be admissible... The question which must 
be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the 
evidence was obtained, were fair. This involves an examination of the ‘unlawfulness’ in 
question and, where violation of another Convention right is concerned, the nature of the 
violation found.218’  
Evidence obtained contravene to the Convention does not guarantee that evidence being 
excluded – the evidence only becomes inadmissible if said evidence is deemed unfair. The 
exception to this is where the evidence has been obtained contrary to article 3 through the use 
of torture,219 where the evidence is omitted regardless of how convincing the evidence may 
be.220  
The UK Courts have traditionally accepted evidence that is obtained though ‘miscellaneous’ 
methods. As in line with the ECtHR, evidence is not omitted from proceedings unless it is 
deemed to be overly unfair to the defendant, regardless of the way it was obtained.221 An 
exception is made however in regards to evidence obtained by torture. The UK case of A and 
Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department222 is a key case concerning the UK stance 
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on the use of evidence obtained by torture. In this case, the appellants claimed that evidence 
used against them had been obtained through the use of torture by a foreign State,223 without 
the complicity of the UK. Shortly after 9/11, the UK government passed that Anti-Terrorism 
Crime and Security Act 2001. Section 21 of this act allows the Home Secretary to authorise, 
where there is a belief that there is a risk to national security, the indefinite detention of a 
foreign national without charge or trial.224 The appeals process is through the Special 
Immigrations Appeals Court (SIAC), with further appeals directed to the Court of Appeal. The 
appellants in this case consisted of 10 foreign nationals that were suspected of having terrorist 
connections to Al Qaida. The appellants alleged that some of the evidence heard by the Home 
Secretary had been obtained by third party torture, and had already attempted to appeal to the 
SIAC.225 
In the 2004 Court of Appeal case, the Court dismissed the appeal and ruled that English 
legislation would permit the use of tainted evidence, providing that the torture was not in any 
way perpetrated or connected to any UK officials. This decision was made by only considering 
domestic English law, holding that article 15 UNCAT was not part of domestic law.226 The 
Committee Against Torture did not consider this conclusion to be consistent with UNCAT.227 
Furthermore, it was considered that the use of third party torture evidence would not violate 
article 6(1) ECHR, unless an appeal was mounted by the accused against the SIAC, as the use 
of such evidence would ensure that the accused would not have a fair trial.228 However, the 
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appellants appealed against the Court of Appeal judgement, and the case was reviewed by the 
House of Lords who allowed the appeal.229 The Court held that the use of tainted evidence 
should be prohibited in trial, because the English common law had for so long objected to its 
use. Furthermore it was considered that the use of such evidence would be contravene to some 
of the most fundamental human rights jus cogens status. In both cases, the Court considered on 
whom the burden of proof resides in situations where tainted evidence is used. Whereas the 
Court of Appeal considered the burden of proof to be with the person the evidence is being 
used against, the House of Lords decided that this would be unfair, particularly because this 
person would not have access to the same scale of investigative powers as the State. This would 
therefore violate the right against self-incrimination.230 
A further case is Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom.231 In this case, the applicant 
had refugee status in the UK after claiming to have been subject to torture by authorities in 
Jordan. Whilst living in the UK in 1999 the applicant was convicted of terror-related offences 
in Jordan. The applicant was detained in 2002 in the UK under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001, before being made subject to a control order in 2005 under the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2005, when the 2001 act was repealed. He was served with a notice of 
intention to deport whilst attempting to appeal the control order. He appealed the deportation 
order, claiming that he would be at risk of indefinite detention, torture, and an unfair trial due 
to the use of evidence obtained by the torture of his co-defendants. SIAC dismissed his appeal, 
which whilst was partially rejected by the Court of Appeal, was upheld by the House of Lords. 
The applicant appealed to the ECtHR under articles 3, 5, 6 and 13. The court dismissed article 
3, deeming it unlikely that the applicant would be subject to torture in Jordan, in part because 
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of his high-profile, and partly because of diplomatic assurances between the UK and Jordan 
that the applicant would not be subject to torture if he was deported. However, the Court found 
that the use of evidence obtained by torture in his retrial would be contrary to article 6 of the 
convention, and that there was a possibility of this happening if he was returned to Jordan. 
Both article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR and article 6(3)(d) ECHR state that anyone subject to 
criminal charges against them is entitled ‘To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against 
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him.’232 Quite simply, if the accused is or has been under the 
duress of torture, and that is how the evidence against him has been obtained, then the accused 
cannot examine the witnesses against him under the same conditions as himself. It would 
appear that the aim of these articles is to ensure that the accused is on an equal footing with his 
accusers. Furthermore, Article 14(3)(g) ICCPR states that anyone facing a criminal charge shall 
‘Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.’233 It could be argued that if 
evidence against the accused has been obtained through the torture of the accused, then he has 
been manipulated to testify against himself. This sort of evidence is concerned with the right 
against self-incrimination. Although this isn’t explicitly mentioned by Article 6 ECHR, it is 
implied in Article 6 ECHR via Article 14(3)(g) ICCPR.234 Furthermore the right against self-
incrimination is protected under Article 15 UNCAT.  
Under Art 6(1) ECHR, evidence that has been obtained by the use of torture that is for use 
against a third party, i.e. not the person that was tortured, is not contrary to the right against 
self-incrimination. This is because in this scenario, the evidence does not incriminate the person 
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tortured235. Article 6(1) ECHR, which states that ‘in the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing… by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law…’236 It does however 
still demand a fair trial, which is clearly violated through unreliable evidence.237 Article 6(3) 
ECHR is also potentially violated in this respect because the ability for the accused to raise a 
valuable defence against the person that made the statement under torture is possibly 
damaged.238 Furthermore, article 6 ECHR is reinforced by article 15 UNCAT.239 Under article 
15 UNCAT, the committee stated in P.E. v France that ‘It must be established that the 
statement cited as evidence in the proceedings in question was obtained as a result of 
torture’240 and that ‘The statement in question must be an essential element of the charges 
brought against the author of the communication.’241 
This chapter has established that torture, inhumane and degrading treatment is prohibited, as 
are any acts that seek to undermine that prohibition, such as complicity in torture, or the 
admission of torture evidence. In addition, the prohibition is absolute, meaning that there are 
no defences to torture or complicit acts. Subsequently, it can only be concluded that the 
prohibition was designed to be broad, so as to ensure that a State could never again justify or 
excuse its use of torture. The third chapter of this thesis will begin by examining the history of 
judicial torture, beginning with the Roman Empire, which will demonstrate how judicial torture 
was used and why it became defunct. This will determine how the current prohibitions against 
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to use of torture came about, and why it is so significant in contrast with the use of torture post-
9/11. Furthermore, this chapter will use Michel Foucault242 and Matthew Hannah243 to 
introduce theoretical discussion of the connection between torture and terrorism 
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CHAPTER THREE: Historical and Theoretical Torture 
 
The Use of Torture Pre-UNCAT 
Torture is by no means a modern phenomenon. Judicial torture was used by the Romans, 
inflicted against slaves in both criminal and civil cases to ensure that their testimony was 
genuine.244 Torture was only to be used against slaves because the idea was that slaves would 
always testify in line with their master’s wishes – in essence, slaves could not be trusted to 
testify the truth without a stronger encouragement than that of their master.245 The Roman 
Courts however did not allow a case to rely entirely upon such testimony – such testimony was 
instead only used in conjunction with other evidence so as to strengthen the overall 
argument.246 Eventually Roman society changed and split into two groups, consisting of 
honestiores and humiliores. Honestiores, the governing class were still exempt from torture. 
Everyone else (the humiliores) however became susceptible to torture during interrogation.247 
Finally, as the Roman criminal code changed and evolved, even the honestiores were subject 
to torture.248 Although this system died out at the fall of the Roman Empire, a similar system 
did re-emerge in Europe in the 13th century.249 Europe then became dependant on confessions 
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forcibly given through the use of torture, up until the 18th century.250 The appeal of judicial 
torture emerged simply because it was easy – when the theory of proof became standardized, 
extracting a confession from the accused was a much simpler way for the judge/prosecution to 
achieve a result, rather than attempting to find the often necessary two eye witnesses and/or 
evidence that did not necessarily exist or was hard to obtain.251  
In England, the use of judicial torture was less common than in the rest of Europe. Prior to the 
Lateran Council of 1215, trials relied on the result of ‘ordeals’ of fire or water, performed in 
front of a Priest. The brutality of ordeals appears to depend on both the nature of the case itself 
and the prior suspicion of the accused’s guilt.252 Ordeal was abolished in 1215 when Priests 
were forbidden from being involved in such a practise, and legislated against in 1219 to be 
replaced by trial by jury.253 The rejection of torture in English common law is a distinguishing 
feature,254 as shown by the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215, which contained a clause on 
prohibiting its use.255 The use of torture on the continent is explicable because of the 
requirement for two eyewitnesses for the most serious crimes, whereas in England, a suspect 
could be sentenced to death for his crimes on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence 
on the continent could only be used to justify using torture on the accused, and not to convict. 
England therefore used less torture than the rest of the continent.256 Torture was regarded as a 
‘foreign practice’, and because there was no need for its use, torture was prohibited by common 
law.257  
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In England, the use of torture against suspected criminals was most prevalent between the years 
of 1540 and 1640, where the Privy Council or Monarch ordered its use on more than 80 
occasions.258 During the Tudor and Stuart periods the Privy Council appeared to ensure that 
any torture committed was done so officially, with torture warrants viewed as part of royal 
prerogative259. However, in Felton’s Case in 1628 it was decided that there was no law 
recognising the legal use of torture.260 After Felton’s Case, the Privy Council never issued 
another torture warrant. Judicially approved torture was not used in England after 1640 when 
the King followed suit and stopped issuing torture warrants.261 By 1708 torture was also 
prohibited in Scotland.262 Torture does not appear to have been used as a method of 
interrogation or extracting confession in Britain since the 16th century, and appears only to have 
been used as a punishment or as a method of execution. Torture stopped being used as 
punishment during the 18th century, because the emphasis shifted on to rehabilitating and 
‘correcting’ the behaviours of criminals,263 as opposed to punishing them - This is something 
discussed by Foucault, and will be developed later in this chapter. Although it is well known 
that convicted criminal’s endured hard physical punishment in Victorian England, whether this 
amounts to torture by today’s definition is an open question.  
Despite this, the use of torture is not limited to medieval England or ancient Rome, and has 
instead been used during times of war throughout the 1900’s. Torture was used in World War 
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II against those that opposed the advancement of Nazi Germany.264 However, the most 
infamous torture was committed in the concentration camps across Europe run by Nazi 
Germany. The purpose of this torture was not traditional, in the sense that its use was not 
judicial or interrogational. The use of torture in these circumstances, against unarmed civilians, 
is debatably some of the most shocking and cruel because there was no ‘higher purpose’ or 
justification for its use. The torture used within concentration camps was not just down to the 
conditions in which prisoners were forced to endure, such as exposure and deprivation, but also 
through the brutality of officials that would met out as punishment whenever they saw fit.265 
In addition to the conditions, some were also used as human subjects in medical 
experimentation, routinely carried out without pain relief or other ethical safeguards, resulting 
in mutilation and death for participants.266  
When the United Nations (UN) was formed in 1945 there was a perceived need for the creation 
of a bill of rights because of what happened throughout World War II.267 This subsequently 
spearheaded the introduction of international human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948.268 Several years 
later the Council of Europe drafted the European Convention of Human Rights, with freedom 
from torture being one of its core fundamental rights. These rights were designed to try and 
prevent the mass use of war crimes, including torture, which was seen throughout World War 
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II. However, torture has continued to be used since this time, both within Europe and beyond. 
Torture was a practise used by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the ‘Cold War’ 
beginning in 1953,269 and from 1954 torture was used by the French against suspected terrorists 
and members of the Algerian National Liberation Front, with the aim of extracting confessions 
during the Algerian conflict.270 Between 1971 and 1972 British forces detained over 3000 
people, and were held to have used inhumane, cruel and degrading against 14 members of the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA).271 Clearly, there was a need for further international law to 
prohibit the use of torture. In 1984, the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT) was formed 
with the aim of protecting the right to freedom from torture and established its own body, the 
Committee against Torture, to observe State obligations and the protection of this right.272 To 
have a convention to specifically manage the prohibition of torture, demonstrates just how 
serious the use of torture is considered internationally. 
 
Torture Post 9/11 
The many and varied human rights treaties prohibiting torture do not appear to have achieved 
their aims at preventing the use of torture by the State or State agents. The use of torture appears 
to have ‘re-emerged’ in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade centre and the 
Pentagon by al-Qaida in September 2001. For example, in 2002 the then Secretary of Defense 
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Donald Rumsfeld signed an Action Memo of Counter-Resistance Techniques,273 and approved 
the use of new military interrogation techniques to use against those suspected of committing 
or planning terrorist related offences. Some of these techniques have gained a reputation for 
amounting to torture or inhumane, cruel or degrading treatment, with the use of 
‘waterboarding’274 gaining particular infamy. Some of the practises used include sleep 
deprivation, forced nudity, slamming detainees against walls, rectal rehydration, prolonged 
used of stress positions, ice water baths, threats of death to the detainee and threatening to harm 
members of the detainees family.275 A further technique used by the CIA at COBALT is known 
as a ‘"rough takedown," in which approximately five CIA officers would scream at a detainee, 
drag him outside of his cell, cut his clothes off, and secure him with Mylar tape. The detainee 
would then be hooded and dragged up and down a long corridor while being slapped and 
punched.’276 
Also came the emergence of ‘extraordinary rendition,’ which is where a person is transferred 
from a State that is legally obliged to prevent torture being used, to a State that does not have 
restrictions concerning the use of torture. Rendition is understood as ‘‘extraordinary’ when it 
is not executed in accordance with the law applying in the State where the person was situated 
at the time of seizure.’277 Although the term extraordinary rendition is relatively new, the 
concept itself is not. During the reign of King Edward II (1307 – 1327), King Edward and the 
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Pope both agreed that prisoners should be transferred to Ponthieu, France, so as to circumvent 
legal restrictions in England that prohibited the use of torture.278 The ‘extraordinary rendition’ 
programme was mostly facilitated by the CIA,279 with the complicity of State’s worldwide. It 
is believed that the CIA rendition programme operated various ‘black sites’ across Europe with 
the complicity of some European States,280 including the United Kingdom. It is estimated that 
at the height of operation, there were 50 prisons across 28 countries, as well as 20 prisons in 
Iraq, 25 in Afghanistan and 17 ‘floating prisons’ which were part of the CIA web of facilities 
used to detain terrorist suspects.281 The CIA operated at least 1245 rendition flights on EU 
territory.282 The extraordinary rendition programme has allegedly been coupled with unlawful 
detention ‘which places the detained person de facto outside the protection of the law.’283 
There were 14 European States listed in a report for the European Parliament by Dick Marty 
that helped set up secret ‘black sites’ within European borders in which to detain and torture 
terrorists, those named being Romania, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Greece and the United Kingdom.284 Other non-European black 
sites were located in Thailand, Iraq, Afghanistan, Diego Garcia and US Navy Briggs.285 In 
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Europe it is alleged that black sites were located in Romania, Poland and Lithuania were used 
to house terror suspects between 2002 and 2006,286 with Lithuania becoming the first State to 
admit hosting said black sites for the CIA287 in 2011. However, rendition was not restricted to 
European States, with detainees rendered for ‘extreme interrogation’ to Egypt, Jordan, Syria, 
Uzbekistan and Morocco.288 All dangerous and valued detainees were transferred to Cuba 
2006, after George W. Bush admitted the existence of black sites.289 The Cuban detention 
facility Guantanamo Bay is infamous for its long term detention, torture, and inhumane 
treatment of detainees that are suspected of terror related offences by the CIA. Guantanamo 
Bay has been vilified by a number of human rights charities and organisations worldwide for 
the alleged systematic use of torture.290  
Concern over the use of tainted information was surpassed when photographic evidence came 
to light that portrayed the U.S. military in a rather unflattering light, during military 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.291 The use of Abu Ghraib as a facility for military 
intelligence began in 2003, and was used primarily to house and interrogate Iraqi insurgents.292 
In 2004 pictures emerged from the Abu Ghraib prison which featured the abuse and torture of 
prisoners perpetrated by American soldiers, thus exposing the alleged use of torture and cruel, 
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inhumane and degrading treatment.293 The case of Baha Mousa is particularly infamous. Baha 
Mousa was a hotel receptionist in Basra who was detained for questioning by British forces in 
2003.294 Within 36 hours he was dead, with 93 separate injuries listed during his post-
mortem,295 exposing the alleged systematic use of torture/inhumane treatment during 
interrogations used by British forces.  
 
Theorizing Torture and Terrorism 
The use of contemporary torture is supposedly confined to intelligence gathering, where the 
information obtained may be used for two main purposes - in a formal capacity such as a 
criminal trial, or for use in further intelligence operations. It can only be presumed that 
information gained through torture has been used in further intelligence operations, because it 
is not something that intelligence agencies or State governments are likely to admit to doing. 
However, it was claimed by George Bush that torture used by the CIA ‘saved British lives,’296 
which indicates that torture has been used to aid in counter-terrorist operations since the ‘war 
on terror’ began.  
The use of torture to extract confession has previously been rampant, and as previously 
discussed, used widely across different continents and periods of time. A particular example in 
England includes the previously mentioned period of the 16th century. Although this thesis is 
not focused on the use of torture specifically for this purpose, there are witness accounts that 
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allege that torture has been used to force the victim to indicate their own guilt in the years since 
9/11,297 with seemingly little regard of what corroborating evidence suggests. It is not hard to 
see the appeal in attempting to force an admission of guilt - “There is a great deal of laziness 
in it. It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's 
eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence.”298 However, irrespective of how useful 
torture may or may not be as a tool in gathering evidence, torture should not be used because 
it is ‘convenient’. If there is to be a serious discussion of the use of torture in counter-terrorism 
investigations, it should be because torture is the only way to obtain the information needed.  
There are several features of State torture identified by Tate299 in Einolf’s300 work. The first is 
that torture is often only used against those who are considered outsiders, such as foreigners. 
The second, is that torture is almost never used against its own citizens, and will only be used 
against its own in extreme circumstances, where the guilt of the person is likely. Thirdly, due 
to the rise in liberal States that take human rights seriously, the use of torture was considerably 
reduced. Subsequently, torture is used by the (liberal) State when it feels under extreme threat 
– terrorism is a clear example of this.301 The use of torture by the State is something well 
documented by Foucault in his theories of societal power relations. For Foucault, the use of 
torture was once used as a ‘spectacle’ of chastisement, where the punishment given out to 
convicted criminals was done so publicly. This was done both to act as discouragement – 
punishment and torture was essentially a display of power – and as an aid in forcing 
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confession.302 However, during the 1800’s the public humiliation of prisoners began to be 
looked upon unfavourably, in part due to the universal adoption of a formal judicial system, 
and also because of changing public attitudes towards ‘the gloomy festival of punishment’303 
(torture). The focus turned instead to rehabilitation,304 and the use of torture for that period of 
time was viewed as counter-productive.  
Hannah has discussed in great detail Michel Foucault’s theories of biopower, governmentality, 
and power/knowledge, and used it to explain why torture is and has been used by the State 
since 9/11, whilst also applying these aspects to modern power relations. Governmentality can 
be defined as a focus on how an individual conducts himself with an emphasis on individual 
freedom. It essentially regulates the individual subliminally through institutions such as 
legislation, welfare and insurance – anything that encourages responsible behaviour.305 
Governmentality is a combination of the ‘technologies of power, which determine the conduct 
of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination’306 and the ‘technologies of the 
self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others… to 
transform  themselves in order to attain a certain state-of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection, or immortality.’307 Biopower is a similar notion, which combines the ‘subjugation 
of bodies and the control of populations.’308 The concept of governmentality is a more liberal 
concept than biopower, because where governmentality is concerned with influencing or 
encouraging the individual to exhibit a certain behaviour, biopower is more concerned with 
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population control,309 in essence an umbrella that encompasses different forms of modern 
power. Biopower and governmentality are central when discussing terrorism, because terrorism 
targets and endangers human life, which the State is concerned and obligated to protect.  
The aim of the State (sovereignty) is to preserve life. This was previously more concerned with 
health issues arising from the environment, such as infectious diseases,310 which is no longer 
the main concern due to a better developed infrastructure and improved health care. Now the 
main concern for States in protecting its citizens is terrorism, because it is one of the biggest 
threats against the State and its principles. Despite a higher fatality rate as a result of other 
forms of crime,311 terrorism is the bigger threat because terrorists have defied the expected 
behaviour of a normal individual that governmentality seeks to influence. Whereas this can, to 
an extent, be true of all criminals, terrorists, and specifically the emergence of the suicide 
bomber, are a threat to the usual logic of wanting to live.312 They in essence do not fit into 
normal assumptions of power. Hence, this poses a challenge to the State – what is the State to 
do with those that do not fear death? In basic terms terrorists “are effectively reducible to a 
dense desire to kill, and that regular criminal and international codes cannot apply to beings 
such as these.”313  
Ambos314 uses Beling’s positivist theory of the prohibition of evidence to discuss why the State 
would be untruthful about its use of torture. Within democratic societies that observe the rule 
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of law (such as the UK), the prohibition of evidence in trial has two prongs – The individual 
component and collective dimension.315 The individual component is best explained as the 
concept of the accused being ‘recognized and respected as an active subject, and not simply 
the object of criminal proceedings.’316 This means that the accused will not be manipulated in 
any manner that seeks to affect his free will (e.g. torture), and that all methods of manipulation 
must be prohibited.317 Hence, any evidence that has been obtained through said manipulation 
of a person’s free will is (or should be) excluded from criminal proceedings. The collective 
dimension is ‘upholding the constitutional integrity of the legal order, especially through the 
guarantee and realization of a fair trial.’318 Essentially, the individual component refers to the 
individuals rights, whereas the collective dimension refers to the moral superiority of the State. 
Both of these components work together to form an integrity that States must abide to, where 
one component would not work without the other – i.e. a State that is willing to manipulate the 
accused cannot maintain its moral integrity. Hence, evidence procured against the principles of 
individual respect also goes against the States moral integrity.319 
However, because the State cannot use manipulation as a tool to find the truth lest it lose its 
integrity, the combination of the individual component and the collective dimension can 
possibly limit the effectiveness in achieving its goal i.e. the preservation of life. Essentially, 
there is conflict between “a functioning administration of criminal justice with the goal of the 
efficient investigation and punishment of criminal offenses, and… the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the accused and the integrity of the system as a whole.”320 Balancing the 
search for the truth with the integrity of the State is seldom achievable for States, because the 
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two do not work together in tandem. This structure has been applied internationally, where one 
of the most important aspects of supranational proceedings is integrity. Subsequently, 
something has to give – either the State does not use torture, or it does and omits to play by the 
rules (i.e. the law) because doing so would be to admit its moral inferiority. Hence, “Whereas 
modern torture retains its affiliation with state power, its practice is not publicly displayed; in 
fact, governments go to great lengths to conceal evidence of detainee mistreatment.”321 
The US for example appears to use torture behind closed doors, whilst pretending they do not. 
In 2009 Barrack Obama signed an executive order promising to close down the Guantanamo 
Bay facility and ban the military use of torture on detainees322 - eight years later however, there 
are still prisoners that remain there. This in itself would suggest that the State is reluctant to 
admit that it uses torture as part of its interrogation repertoire. This arguably links in to Ambos’ 
idea that the declining international reputation of the State would endure, an example of which 
is the United States following the Abu Ghraib revelations:323“Abu Ghraib revelations have 
caused to the already-ailing reputation of the United States as a defender of freedom, 
democracy, and human rights, the administration has distanced itself from torture in public 
pronouncements since May 2004… but at the same time it has worked behind the scenes to 
defend its recourse to the widest possible range of interrogation methods.”324 Simultaneously 
however, the State also attempts to justify its use of torture. For example, in 2010 George W. 
Bush claimed that the use of waterboarding on 9/11 terrorist Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
revealed and helped to prevent 31 terrorist plots, including attacks on Canary Wharf and 
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Heathrow Airport.325 The US has followed a pattern, whereby ‘customary international law 
was sufficiently strong to compel torturing regimes to officially deny their wrongdoing, which 
they did in common patterns: literal denial (we don’t torture); interpretative denial (what we 
do isn’t torture); and implicatory denial (torture was the work of rogues and/or our enemies 
deserve what is done to them).’326 
Transnational terrorism poses a particular risk, because although it is in all States interests to 
combat, it is not in any one States control. Because it is a threat to all States citizens, it is a 
threat to all States sovereignty and power. This may in some part explain the complex multi-
State networks of intelligence and torture. Hence ‘spaces of exception’ such as Guantanamo 
Bay, Abu Ghraib and other forms of ‘legal blackholes’ were formed:327 “This aspect of the new 
terrorist threat constitutes a major challenge to power/knowledge (because of the 
inaccessibility of the information needed to protect social order) and to sovereignty (because 
the holders of this crucial information are not subject to U.S. government authority).”328 As 
discussed by Welch, whereas for Foucault the prison was a place to encourage morality and 
discipline to its prisoners already convicted and found guilty, the purpose of Guantanamo and 
other detention facilities emerging after 9/11 was entirely different, its purpose being to extract 
information in seemingly whatever way possible from those that have not been convicted of a 
crime.329 
                                                          
325 BBC News, ‘George W Bush claims UK lives 'saved by waterboarding'’ (BBC News, 09/11/2010) 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11715577, Accessed: 03/11/2015 
326 Lisa Hajjar, ‘Does Torture Work? A Sociolegal Assessment of the Practice in Historical and Global 
Perspective’ [2009] 5(3) Annual Review of Law and Social Science 11, 312 
327 Matthew Hannah, ‘Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a Geographical Imagination of 
Power/ Knowledge’ [2006] 96(3) Annals of the Association of American Geographers 622, 632 
328Matthew Hannah, ‘Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a Geographical Imagination of 
Power/ Knowledge’ [2006] 96(3) Annals of the Association of American Geographers 622, 632 
329 Michael Welch, ‘American ‘Pain-ology’ in the War on Terror: a Critique of ‘Scientific’ Torture’ [2009] 13(4) 
Theoretical Criminology 451, 462 
One of the many modes of justification used by both academics and States is the ticking bomb 
scenario. The State and the media encourage an almost constant ticking-bomb situation, shown 
in two ways. Realistically, there are selected areas within the UK which are more likely to be 
a terrorism target, such as London or Manchester, as opposed to more remote locations, yet the 
whole of the UK is assessed as equally at risk. Similarly, every individual is treated as a 
possible threat, as shown by debatably excessive ‘stop and search’ powers for the police, and 
helpline initiatives which encourage the public to call if they sense anything remotely 
‘suspicious’. This creates the perception of constant danger.330 Subsequently, the risk that 
terrorism poses can be blurred and difficult to determine. If the perceived risk of terrorism is 
high, then torture becomes more justifiable, both in the mind of the State and its citizens: “It is 
through the nationalized ticking-bomb scenario that the biopolitical and governmental threat 
of terrorism is transformed into a justification for torture.”331 
Frank332 further discusses how the State validates counter-terrorism measures by the use of fear 
mongering, creating a ‘politics of fear’, an example of which is the Iraq war in 2003. Frank’s 
argument in this case is that the government has and will use the fear of what could happen, as 
opposed to what has happened, to rationalise extreme measures as part of counter-terrorism 
policy. He observes that members of the U.S. government whipped fear amongst the public by 
discussing Iraq’s supposed ownership of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), before using 
WMD’s as justification for invading Iraq, by arguing the possible threat333. Speaking about 
Saddam Hussein and his suspicion of WMD’s at the State of Union address in January 2003, 
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George W. Bush said that “Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger 
facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass 
murder...”334 His use of the word ‘could’ is interesting, considering that he produced seemingly 
no evidence that Iraq actually had WMD’s (indeed none were found during the war or since), 
or that Iraq had any plans to use said WMD’s. Ultimately, the combination of suggestive 
language and fear “results in the public feeling the need for protection against the supposed 
problem or threat and more inclined to legitimize stringent and coercive measures to achieve 
this.”335  
Welch discusses the ‘scientification’ of torture, originally introduced by the CIA during the 
Cold War.336 The use of psychology in determining tortures effectiveness during interrogation 
is an example of how the State has attempted to use science to not only find the truth, but 
rationalise any ethical concerns society may have. For Mavelli, science is particularly 
important in modern society because it is a way for society to explain why things happen, i.e. 
find the truth, something which was previously explained by religion. However, science has 
not proved itself to be completely effective in global risk, terrorism a prime example of such.337 
Furthermore, Welch points out that the State staffs its facilities, such as Guantanamo Bay, with 
‘experts’ in extracting much needed information from its detainees, which further supports the 
States justification for the use of torture to extract information from its prisoners. Therefore, 
torture is in some ways viewed as the remedy to the threat of terrorism because of the 
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knowledge (information/intelligence) supposedly gained from using it. The idea is that if 
torture prevents terrorism, then the normal structures of power and governmentality can 
resume.338 The longer the war on terrorism goes on for, the more likely it is that there will be 
permanent damage to said power structures with undesirable consequences for the state, as “it 
is not unusual for perpetrators of terrorist attacks to seek to instill fear among citizens either 
to alienate them from the government or to make them lose faith in the government’s ability to 
protect [them].”339 Thus, if terrorists are successful in making the population doubt their safety 
within the State, this causes disruption to the hierarchy of State power. 
 
This chapter has followed the development of the international prohibitions, both from a 
historical and theoretical perspective, which has established that torture has been used by the 
State for various reasons, and is not used solely to established guilt. Moreover, it has 
established that terrorism is a threat not just to the individual, but also to the State’s sovereign 
power. Subsequently, the State has perpetuated torture as a remedy to terrorism. The fourth 
chapter of this thesis aims to establish if the regulation of complicity in torture would help 
intelligence agencies counter terrorism. This will be done by firstly identifying and critically 
evaluating previous proposals for the regulation of torture itself, before discussing these 
proposals in the context of ‘complicity’. This chapter will attempt to balance the problems the 
prohibition of torture can cause for law enforcement and intelligence officials, whilst also 
debating the issues arising from deregulating the prohibition, including reputational damage, 
State accountability and metaphorical slippery slopes. 
                                                          
338 Matthew Hannah, ‘Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a Geographical Imagination of 
Power/ Knowledge’ [2006] 96(3) Annals of the Association of American Geographers 622, 631 
339 David Long [1990] in Matthew Hannah, ‘Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a 
Geographical Imagination of Power/ Knowledge’ [2006] 96(3) Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 622, 626 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESPONDING TO THE CURRENT LAW 
 
Previous Proposals for the Use of Torture 
In the years since 9/11, there have been various ex ante and ex post proposals arguing in favour 
of the use of torture, including torture warrants, ‘torture lite,’ defences and ‘official 
disobedience’. Dershowitz’s torture warrants idea has derived from England’s use of such 
warrants during the 16th century. He proposes that ‘non-lethal’340 torture could be deployed by 
obtaining a warrant from a judge, who would examine the evidence and situation before 
providing a warrant. One of the main claimed advantages to this idea is that it prevents torture 
from being used by anyone against anyone, because State officials would have to justify their 
actions before they carried them out. Subsequently, judges would only give out warrants in the 
most desperate of scenarios. However, due to a lack of personal experience in torture, it may 
be difficult for judges to not overly rely on the information received by the applicant/s, i.e. 
State officials from the security services, and may therefore result in more warrants given out 
that what the law ‘intended.’341 Conversely, having an accountable legal system specifically 
for torture would ‘loosen tongues’, possibly without even having to use torture.342 In other 
words, the prospect of being tortured might in itself encourage terrorist suspects to make frank 
admissions. In contrast, if there is a legal system in place, terrorists may retaliate by training 
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themselves to withstand torture, perhaps in a similar manner to the distribution of ‘anti-
interrogation’ techniques encouraged by the IRA.343 
A similar warrant system to the one proposed by Dershowitz could be put in place for State 
complicity in two ways – assistance and information. In the first scenario, the State may apply 
to a judge to assist a State in torture where the suspect is considered a risk to the States interests. 
This scenario would essentially see State officials seeking permission for involvement in 
otherwise prohibited acts, and would be limited to obtaining a warrant for requesting that the 
torturing State ask the suspect specific questions when he is tortured. Assistance warrants 
would potentially be redundant for anything other than requesting certain questions to be put 
forth to a suspect, as judges may be unwilling to allow State officials to physically assist the 
use of torture in a foreign State due to its controversial nature.  
Furthermore, physical assistance in torture would likely face the same criticisms of the original 
torture warrants proposal. The second form of warrant would require permission for the 
acceptance and use of information, where the information has or may have been obtained by 
the use of torture, as opposed to using or assisting the torture itself.  The main issue with this 
scenario however, is that if the applicants were to apply to use the information in any form of 
judicial proceeding, there may be a conflict of interests because the warrant system would also 
be judicial. Whereas the system may still apply in an operational situation, if a warrant was not 
granted because the judge did not feel it was justified, State agents could potentially continue 
to use the information in an operational vicinity, regardless of whether a warrant was required 
to do so. 
A further proposal for torture law is so-called torture lite. For Bell, torture is hierarchical, with 
three categories of torture that are ranged according to severity – classic torture, cruel and 
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degrading, and psychologically coercive.344 Bell describes ‘classic’ torture as severe physical 
harm, such a beatings or electric shock that will leave lasting physical damage to the person it 
is administered on. By contrast, psychological coercion involves some sort of deception as 
opposed to cruelty.345 Cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment and short-term physical harm 
is something often referred to as ‘torture lite’. The idea of torture lite has become popular with 
self-styled democratic States.346 This is because it differs from ‘classic’ torture, as its emphasis 
is more inclined towards the stress and discomfort of its victim, as opposed to the actual 
physical mutilation of the body.347  
Torture lite has been previously discussed by Wolfendale,348 Schlink,349 and Kreimer,350 
amongst others. However, one of the main arguments against torture lite is that you cannot 
determine an individual’s pain threshold, and what may be unbearable to one person may be 
bearable for another. Subsequently, it may be difficult to determine a universal ‘torture lite’. In 
terms of assistance, it could be argued that the assisting State may be more ‘ethical’ if said 
State was only complicit in torture lite, as opposed to ‘classic’ torture. Conversely, it could be 
argued that if a State is complicit in torture, then the type of torture it assists is irrelevant.   
An ex post approach to torture law would be the use of the necessity defence.351 As discussed 
in chapter two, the defence of necessity is not currently applicable for torture. A defence could 
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work for complicity in torture, particularly in assisting torture in another State, rather than the 
use of information communicated. For example, if the complicit State was to receive 
information of an imminent attack, and the torturing State had a suspect in custody that may 
have further information about what was to transpire, the complicit State may be able to defend 
sending questions for the suspect to be asked under duress. The biggest advantage to an ex post 
method is that State agents would not have the difficult task of justifying their actions before 
they were carried out. Furthermore, State agents would not have to spend time applying for 
warrants or otherwise seeking permission in emergency situations. However, the biggest 
disadvantage to this sort of approach is that the State has to be prepared to actually prosecute 
its agents,352 as not prosecuting them would lead to a lack of accountability. 
A further proposal is to, in essence, do nothing. Gross and Jessberger have similar ideas, 
whereby the laws that prohibit torture do not change, but that way that torture is treated after 
the fact does. Gross suggested that if the ticking bomb scenario was to ever come to fruition, 
then there should be a ‘defence’ of ‘official disobedience’. Jessberger suggested a ‘guilty, but 
not to be punished’353 proposal, e.g. showing mercy if the torture was to be committed within 
the ticking bomb scenario. The main difference between the two proposals is the 
encouragement of the State. In Gross’s proposal, the State would have limited involvement in 
the individual’s choice to torture, hence the official has been disobedient. Jessberger uses the 
case of Gafgen v Germany354 as inspiration, particularly concentrating on the sentence received 
by police officials involved in the threats of torture.355  
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Both of these proposals could arguably be implemented in the context of torture assistance. If 
the assisting State received information from the torturing State that there was to be an 
imminent attack, and officials from the assisting State were to request further questioning 
(torture) of a suspect, the officials could claim that they were working on their own initiative, 
if the case was ever to be brought before a Court. Although Gross argues that implementing 
torture within the legal system could lead to ‘institutionalization,356 if torture and assisting acts 
are unofficially sanctioned, then neither the torture nor the officials involved are accountable. 
Arguably, this would lead to the institutionalization of unofficial torture, which would surely 
be worse. Furthermore, it would also be up to the Courts to interpret a supposedly non-
derogable law, which could arguably lead to the ‘forgivable’ torture benchmark being less than 
the case before it.357  
 
The Purpose and Use of Torture 
Before implementing regulation to allow the use and exchange of information, there must also 
be discussion of the scenarios information obtained by torture could be used in. As discussed 
in chapter one, intelligence is used for several main purposes: operational, criminal trial and 
other formal proceedings. However, when torture is considered, there is a further use of torture, 
that is, the infamous ticking bomb scenario. The ticking bomb is a hypothetical scenario which 
is almost always discussed in reference to the torture debate. The scenario usually begins with 
the State being informed about an active bomb that has been placed in a busy public area, such 
as London, which is subsequently likely to kill a large number of innocent people. However, 
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the State does not know the exact location of the bomb. The State has the mastermind of this 
plot in custody, but he or she is refusing to reveal where the bomb is.  
For Shue,358 the ticking bomb is an unsophisticated scenario based on a number of idealisations. 
He lists two requirements needed for the torture of ticking bomb terrorist to stop the bomb from 
exploding: The first is that the State has the actual perpetrator in custody; the second is that the 
perpetrator reveals where the bomb is in time to diffuse it.359 Kleinig goes further in his 
scepticism of the ticking bomb; the threat is not a mere possibility, but a known fact; action 
needs to be taken to avert this threat; the threat is real and catastrophic; torture is the only way 
to get the necessary information to avert this threat; the resulting information will almost 
guarantee that the bomb will be found and diffused.360 It could be argued that the ticking bomb 
scenario touted by those that support torture law contains too many assumptions. For example, 
it cannot be guaranteed that torture is the only way to get the information needed, nor that the 
information obtained by torture will result in diffusing the bomb. Essentially, what Shue and 
Kleinig both agree on is that the ticking bomb scenario will almost certainly never happen.  
Despite this, Gross361 insists that the ticking bomb scenario is a real threat, albeit rare, hence 
torture regulation must be established to protect against this. Although it could be argued that 
the case of Gafgen362 supports the possibility of a real ticking bomb, it could be contended that 
the likelihood of a terrorist successfully planning/executing a terror attack, being detained 
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shortly before the bomb goes off, with the authorities having no prior intelligence whatsoever, 
is very slim indeed. 
It may be argued that the State’s use of information obtained by torture, indicating an imminent 
ticking bomb scenario is more forgiving than the use of torture itself, because the State is 
merely using the resources available, as opposed to actually encouraging torture. In fact, not 
acting upon information that indicates the threat of an imminent terrorist attack because the 
information was the result of torture, would arguably be viewed as ill-advised, and possibly 
even breach the States positive duty to protect the security of its citizens.363 In practise, any 
State receiving information that can protect the State from a very imminent danger, is unlikely 
to scrutinise the source before it attempts to divert the threat. Accepting and using torture 
information is morally different to using torture, mainly because the act has already been 
committed and cannot be prevented, whereas the information obtained by the act has the 
potential to prevent a catastrophe.  
On the other hand, one of the issues with torture is that the information given by the suspect 
may be conflicting or misleading. Alternatively, this could be fact-checked against other 
available information. However, if the supposed attack is imminent then there may not be 
sufficient time to do this fully. On the other hand, perfection in evidence is not needed – just 
enough to detect the location of the bomb. Subsequently, the receiving/complicit State is 
placing a huge amount of trust in the suspect and torturing State, which is not particularly ideal, 
as it could lead both States to waste resources better used elsewhere.364 Consequently, the 
ticking bomb scenario seems unlikely to ever occur. Hence, if this is justification for why the 
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use of information obtained by the use of torture should be legalised, then there seems to be 
little to persuade someone of the pressing need for this type of legislation. 
However, the ticking bomb is not the only situation in which information obtained by torture 
could potentially be used. Indeed, information extracted in this way could be used to prevent 
future attacks that are not classed as imminent, to locate terrorist networks, identify patterns 
and methods etc. It could be argued that the use of torture information in this scenario is 
potentially still morally justified, as ‘Zealots inspired by Islamic militancy and willing to 
immolate themselves in suicide assaults are not likely to share their secrets under the 
comparatively mild duress of humane captivity.’365 The use of intelligence to aid in operational 
security purposes has not been discussed much throughout this thesis. Due to the secretive 
nature of how intelligence agencies operate, it is difficult to assess how useful such information 
would be in this respect. However, it was rumoured that the information that lead to the death 
of former Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011 was obtained by the use of 
waterboarding and/or other inhumane methods, although this was denied by both Donald 
Rumsfeld and John Brennan, Barrack Obama’s counter terrorist advisor.366  
The third main potential use for torture evidence is criminal and formal proceedings. As already 
discussed in chapter two, evidence that has been obtained by torture is currently prohibited in 
English law.367 Clearly this can cause difficult issues for law enforcement. Any information 
that may have derived from torture, even if received innocently, cannot be used to convict those 
indicated. However, if torture evidence was admissible within the criminal justice system, one 
of the biggest issues it would need to overcome is that torture does not guarantee reliable or 
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truthful information.368 Although witness testimony, which is a common source of evidence 
within criminal trials, also does not guarantee the truth, witness testimony has not (as a general 
rule) been coerced out of the witness against their will. Furthermore, any evidence deriving 
from the torture of the defendant himself, in which the defendant indicates his own guilt, may 
be very difficult to justify. Subsequently, if the State would like to use information pertaining 
from torture in any judicial proceedings, the State would need to explore the possibility of 
additional legislation to make the use of torture evidence useable for this purpose.  
 
The Morals of Torture 
Having discussed the possible uses for information obtained by torture, it is now possible to 
assess the morality of using such information. The question is not a straight-forward ‘is torture 
morally wrong?’ – most people would agree that in normal circumstances, the use of torture to 
coerce or manipulate an individual to reveal information is wrong. However, terrorism is hardly 
what would be considered a normal circumstance.  
Hoffman369 notes three theories to measure the morals of torture. The first is the deontological 
theory which does not permit torture under any circumstances. The second is utilitarianism, 
which notes that torture is morally correct where the harm caused by torture is significantly 
beneficial to the rest of society. The third is threshold deontology, which finds torture morally 
permissible when the societal benefit outweighs the torture of another.370 Both the utilitarian 
and threshold deontology theories would at least accept (or even expect) torture to be used to 
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save lives in a scenario similar to the ticking bomb.371 It would appear that where torture is 
considered in almost all circumstances to be morally wrong, the utilitarian and threshold 
deontology theories indicate that it is justified if the information it produces saves lives. 
However, under both of these theories the use of torture essentially has to be ‘legitimized’. 
Dershowitz372 is of the opinion that torture is (at least) morally permissible in scenarios such 
as the ‘ticking bomb’ (discussed below) because it is the ‘lesser of two evils’ to use torture 
against someone if that then saves lives. Similarly, Gross373 appears to identify with the 
threshold deontology approach and believe that torture is permissible if it protects the public. 
However, if the issue boils down to the quality of information gained, then torture can surely 
never be justified, as the quality of information gained is not something that can be guaranteed 
before the torture is carried out. Furthermore, if that person does not possess the information 
needed to save lives, then the use of torture is also not morally justified.  
The moral dimensions of assisting torture would subsequently follow a similar track. As 
discussed in chapter two, complicity in criminal law is treated the same or similar as 
committing the act itself. From a moral standpoint, encouraging or assisting torture is enabling 
the act – i.e. enabling the infliction of pain on a person. However, it could be argued that the 
morals of using information obtained by torture are more complicated. Firstly, it could be 
suggested that not using torture in a ticking bomb scenario would be itself immoral because of 
the many lives it could potentially save.374 It could therefore be argued that the same principle 
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could apply to information – if for example a State received information of an imminent attack, 
and didn’t act upon it because it came from torture, it could potentially result in a mass-fatality 
attack. Arguably, using the information from torture actually has less moral complications, 
because whereas you cannot guarantee that torture will produce information that will protect 
the public, if the information is already available then it could be suggested that using that 
information is less harmful than the potential harm caused to the public. 
It could be suggested that because society views State torture morally permissible or correct 
given the circumstances, it indicates that it is less about the act, and more about who is 
committing the act and why. This is something discussed by Tarrant et al.,375 who indicates 
that society is more willing to morally agree with something depending on who it is that is 
proposing it. Furthermore, a 2014 poll by the Washington Post found that 58% of American 
responders felt that CIA torture was justified ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’,376 whereas 36% of 21,000 
global respondents polled between 2013 and mid 2014 believed that torture can be justified if 
it can protect the public.377 The same Amnesty poll found that 45% of the American responders 
felt that torture could be justified, but only 29% of UK responders felt the same. However, the 
main issue with morality is that it is personal, and is therefore subject to change. Whereas 
torture 20 years ago may not have been considered morally permissible to most people, those 
moral beliefs may have now changed considering that the terror threat is higher. It could 
therefore be suggested that it is very difficult to justify regulating such a morally-charged act 
when said morals are subject to change.  
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 The Reliability of Torture - Does Coercive Interrogation Work?  
As discussed above, if torture does not produce the results needed to prevent harm then it is 
not morally defensible. There has been an abundance of academic literature in the post-9/11 
era on the topic itself. Some of the most well-known controversial views have emanated from 
Dershowitz378 who claims that torture can be reliable, or will at least work. The discussion of 
tortures effectiveness is theoretical, as there are no study groups, no participants to test, and no 
data to analyse.379 However, the lack of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of torture 
works both ways: it is also difficult to argue that torture does not work, as there are no figures 
to show how often torture works versus how often torture doesn’t work.  
Even those that have endorsed torture would agree that there are certain standards and 
procedures that must be adhered to if torture is to work.380 The first is to ensure that the suspect 
is not an innocent - this means there must be a certain standard of proof to ensure the suspect’s 
involvement/guilt before torture can be administered.381 The easiest way of ensuring the guilt 
of a person/s is when they have been convicted of a terror-related offence, however the 
likelihood of that person having relevant information that an interrogator would find useful 
decreases over time.382 Furthermore, as already discussed in chapter two, terror groups tend to 
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change their habits when one of their own is arrested/detained. Welch has discussed what is 
termed ‘one-sided scepticism’, whereby interrogators may view their own judgements as 
superior as a result of their expertise, and thus results in tunnel vision which ‘puts interrogators 
on a pathway to misclassify an innocent person as guilty.’383 Therefore, if interrogators are 
assuming the guilt of suspects without evidence/conviction, this could result in the use of 
torture against someone that is innocent.  
The second is that the interrogator only uses torture where the suspect refuses to talk, and 
therefore as a last resort.384 The biggest issue with this is that the suspect may refuse to answer 
the interrogators questions because they do not know the answer, out of spite, or fear of what 
may happen to them if they do. The third is that the interrogator does not exceed the minimum 
amount of pain needed to obtain the information needed.385 Of course, it would appear difficult 
to determine how much pain would be needed for each particular suspect before they reveal all 
the interrogator wants to know: ‘what severe pain as opposed to normal pain is can finally only 
be determined individually and that severe pain is simply the pain that breaks a person's 
resistance? May we inflict pain until the person breaks because until then the pain is obviously 
not severe?’386 Furthermore, it could be argued that interrogators may feel pressured to use 
more torture to either get the suspect to reveal information quicker,387 or because they believe 
they are withholding information that they don’t actually have. The biggest resulting issue for 
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a State accepting information from a torturing State, is if the suspect reveals information that 
isn’t actually true.388 Thus it could be argued that any information that torture produces cannot 
be reliable, particularly as standalone information. 
 
The Current Prohibition of Torture and Complicity 
Having assessed the morality and reliability of torture, the reasoning behind the prohibition 
may appear clearer. Clearly there was strong reasoning for prohibiting torture in the first place, 
not least because of the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany during the Second World 
War.389 However, as suggested by McCarthy, as noble as it is to say that torture should never 
ever be used because it is so awful, terrorism was not as large a problem when these treaties 
were created as it is now: ‘Terrorism in general is not a new phenomenon, but today’s global 
and systematic menace is plainly not the threat that was contemplated when international 
humanitarian law… took root… They did not take account of a situation in which our highest 
priority would be to obtain… intelligence.’390 As discussed above, public attitudes become 
more sympathetic towards the arguments for using torture in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. 
Therefore, it could be presumed that attitudes become more hostile towards torture when faced 
with the destruction it can cause. A clear example of this is the public shock at being presented 
with the photographic evidence of torture at Abu Ghraib.391  
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It could be argued that UNCAT, ECHR, UDHR etc. were knee-jerk reactions, prohibiting 
torture automatically because its use as an interrogational tactic has, and could continue to be 
‘abused’. If torture is prohibited because of its tendency to be abused, then the information 
arising from torture is prohibited for several reasons, the first being that it would be unethical 
to use information deriving from an illegal act.392 Secondly, allowing information that derives 
from torture would create supply and demand, and the act of torture would not be sufficiently 
discouraged. Thirdly, the information is not guaranteed to be reliable, because the person 
tortured may not be truthful or may not have the answers the interrogators are looking for.393  
It is clear that the prohibition in its current form does not work, as ‘torture is practised in more 
than 90 per cent of all countries and constitutes a widespread practice in more than 50 per 
cent of all countries.’394 If torture is a widespread as is suggested, and if torture will continue 
to be used regardless of the prohibition, then is it not better that it is (a) regulated and (b) used 
for the ‘greater good?’  Conversely, it could be contented that there will always be paedophiles, 
so should paedophilia not be regulated or deserving of defences? Though the proposition of 
torture and assistance in torture may appear justified when discussed in connection with 
counterterrorism, Conrad et al. argues that different States abuse human rights for different 
reasons and incentives, and that military torture by democratic States increases when 
transnational terrorism is rife.395 Conrad also details that States may use torture aside from as 
a method of intelligence collection, and that it may also be used as a method of deterrence, 
                                                          
392 For example, many would consider the use of data from the experiments at Nazi concentration camps 
unethical because of the lack of concern for the wellbeing of the subjects, many of whom died – Kristine Moe, 
‘Should the Nazi Research Data Be Cited?’ [1984] 14(6) The Hastings Center Report 5  
393 Samantha Newbery, Bob Brecher, Philippe Sands & Brian Stewart, ‘Interrogation, Intelligence and the Issue 
of Human Rights’ [2009] 24(5) Intelligence and National Security 631, 636 
394 Nowak [2012] in Steven Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
Really ‘Absolute’ in International Human Rights Law’ [2015] 0 Human Rights Law Review 1, 8 
395 Courtenay Conrad, ‘Who Tortures the Terrorists? Transnational Terrorism and Military Torture’ [2014] 0 
Foreign Policy Analysis 1, 2 - 3 
effectively using torture as both trial and punishment for the criminal act of terrorism.396 What 
Conrad appears to be hinting towards, is that torture is a slippery slope, a topic that now can be 
discussed in its own right. 
 
The Slippery Slope  
Admittedly, the slippery slope metaphor posing as an ‘argument’ is usually confined to the 
discussion of legalising torture, not the assistance of or use of information pertaining from 
torture. However, it can be assumed that similar arguments could be made. The argument has 
been discussed in a vast range of publications in connection with torture post 9/11, by 
academics including Greer,397 Shue,398 O’Rourke et al.,399 Bagaric & Clark etc., and is best 
summed up by the latter: ‘The slippery slope argument is often invoked in relation to acts that 
in themselves are justified, but which have similarities with objectionable practices.’400 
Subsequently, the discussion turns to whether these acts, which are currently justified, will 
filter down to be used for reasons that are not justified – in the case of torture, will the torture 
be justified when used occasionally, in situations such as the ticking bomb, or will it begin to 
be used more often, or for situations other than terrorism?401 Greer (2015) himself States ‘My 
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own hitherto unwavering faith in the absolutist cause was shattered by the case of Gafgen v 
Germany,’402 indicating that there is potential support for the use of torture outside of terrorism. 
The threat/use of torture in a scenario similar to that of Gafgen is essentially a ‘ticking bomb’ 
case. However, qualifying the case of Gafgen is admitting that there are already situations that 
are not connected to terrorism, where the use of torture is considered justifiable. 
In the case of the assistance of torture, it could be suggested that regulating the use of 
intelligence obtained by torture appears strange if you do not also regulate the use of torture 
itself. It would seem that the obvious progression from merely using information pertaining 
from cruel treatment, would be to start using obtaining your own information, using the same 
or similar methods. As discussed in chapter one, much of intelligence is based on the exchange 
of information with other foreign intelligence agencies. Would the State (legally) receiving 
information pertaining from torture not feel the temptation to start exchanging their own? 
Moreover, would intelligence services and State agents not start relying on torture more and 
more, whether that be reliance on the fruits or the act itself?:  
‘Assuming that torture may be deemed a more effective interrogation technique than its 
alternatives, we can expect members of security services to become increasingly more 
dependent on the use of such coercive techniques… Their careers depending on their 
ability to foil future attacks, interrogators are likely… to opt for those interrogation 
methods that are deemed to provide the fastest answers. And what starts off as using 
exceptional methods in exceptional circumstances may… be internalized and applied in 
a growing number of cases.’403 
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Of course, ‘complicity’ is not simply limited to receiving information from other States, but 
can also consist of assisting other States to commit the act itself. If the assisting State did not 
want to go down the route of the slippery slope and become more involved than what it deems 
to be justified, the State in question would have to have very clear guidelines about how much 
involvement it will allow its agents to have. However, this in itself is not a guarantee that it 
will not become tempted to start using torture itself, especially when history has not proved 
itself able to resist temptation. As previously discussed in chapter three, the Roman judicial 
process eventually evolved over time, firstly using torture only on slaves or foreigners, before 
beginning to use torture on its citizens and the privileged classes. Could this be the first torture-
related example of the so-called ‘slippery slope’?:  
‘The lesson of history is that, when the law is not there to keep watch over it, the practice 
is always at risk of being resorted to in one form or another by the executive branch of 
government. The temptation to use it in times of emergency will be controlled by the 
law wherever the rule of law is allowed to operate.’404 
 
Accountability  
In essence, if a State is to avoid the ‘slippery slope’, the State needs to ensure that its agents 
are completely accountable. Moreover, the State would need to be accountable if it was to 
counteract the probable criticism that the assistance in torture would incur, and ensure that any 
information deriving from torture is used within a regulated system, which would ensure the 
reliability and authenticity of the information. Furthermore, this system would need to have 
very clear guidelines for the ‘main offender’ State, for example, dictating detainee conditions, 
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recording what torture ‘techniques’ have been used etc., so as to minimise abuse. The main 
purpose to having an accountable system is that the State and its agents would be subject to 
observations of its activities, and may therefore be reluctant to assist torture or use torture 
information unless absolutely necessary. Alternatively, it could be suggested that the reputation 
of a State would not suffer so greatly if it continued to use torture outside of the law, as opposed 
to within the law. A possible advantage to this scenario is that State officials may be reluctant 
to use it on a regular occurrence due to its illegality, however considering its alleged widespread 
use across Europe after 9/11, this may not be entirely accurate. Likewise, Dershowitz has 
argued that officials would likely use torture less if it was permitted.405 Subsequently, it would 
make sense that if torture is used less, then complicity in torture will also decrease. 
Furthermore, it would be difficult to use any information from torture within the criminal 
justice system, although its information could possibly still be used within an internal, 
operational vicinity.  
Additionally, the reputation of intelligence services are important, because some States may be 
reluctant to knowingly receive and exchange information with States that use torture or are 
otherwise complicit, and may therefore decide to cut-ties or reduce working with such 
agencies.406 Although this scenario appears to be unlikely due to previous events,407 if this did 
happen then the State would greatly reduce the flow of information it needs to prevent terrorist 
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threats, the opposite of what a State interested in the legalisation of torture evidence would 
likely intend.  
However, it could be argued that it is not merely just the reputation of the State that is of 
concern. The State that is the ‘main offender’ in the use of torture would need to assemble 
some sort of ‘torture team’408 made up of interrogators, psychologists, doctors and other 
military/legal personnel. As discussed in chapter three, the State that is complicit in torture may 
provide equipment, extradite suspects, send questions for the suspect to be asked, or allow 
torture to be performed on their territories. Both States therefore would require a team of 
personnel. The opinions of personnel on the use or assistance of torture are important, both 
because it might be against their own personnel moral code, and because they might also have 
concerns about their individual reputations. Furthermore, the institutions that personnel might 
be part of may also have reputational concerns, such as the American Psychological 
Association,409 which refuted the use of psychologist’s involvement in torture at the 
Guantanamo Bay facility. Whereas it might be possible reduce the risk of personnel refusing 
to be involved in torture complicity within certain sectors, other roles require more specific 
expertise: ‘Either “torturers” are just thugs who have no clue what they are doing… or some 
can have some genuine expertise.’410 This may result in having a team of personnel that are not 
competent or experienced, and ultimately result in a team of people that are not expert enough 
the deal with this highly sensitive scenario in a professional manner. Hence, the State may 
possibly see history repeat itself, with State agents acting beyond what they are sanctioned to 
do and/or abusing their position. 
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Particularly when considering past events, it could be argued that State actors would need to 
be held to incredibly high standards to ensure that they remain professional, and that they are 
held to account when they fail to do so. The previously discussed example of the Snowden 
leaks perfectly illustrates how intelligence programmes can appear to spiral out of control when 
their actions are not accountable. In its participation of the Prism programme (and other 
methods) which observed millions of (seemingly) random communications every day,411 staff 
at GCHQ were allegedly left to fill the gaps in the legislation, and it has been suggested that 
the law was specifically written to be broad enough to enable GCHQ to collect a vast amount 
of communication.412 Although the controversy of mass surveillance is not something this 
thesis aims to discuss, these revelations did highlight how the concerns of provocative counter-
terrorism measures that allegedly conflict with human rights are seemingly ignored. If the State 
did implement some variation of torture law that was written in a similarly ‘broad’ manner, it 
could prove disastrous for the human rights of those accused of withholding valuable 
information. For example, the treatment of detainees by British armed forces in Iraq, in some 
instances, could only be described as brutal and excessive, even by those that endorse forms of 
torture law.413 Where there appears to be little accountability in intelligence services as it stands 
already,414 would torture law be just another opportunity for a State to engage in the abuse of 
basic fundamental freedoms?  
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One of the ways in which a State could ensure that its agents, particularly those that are in 
positions of authority and responsibility, are accountable for their actions is to ensure that there 
is a legal process for those that fail to act reasonably. However, it would appear that due to past 
opportunities to do so, that this would be unlikely to occur. In the US, President Obama ruled 
out the prosecutions of those allegedly involved in torture at Guantanamo bay,415 even though 
some of the techniques used on detainees far surpassed the ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ 
that were approved during the Bush administration. The Senate Committee Report found that 
whilst sleep deprivation was officially approved for 72 hours to be considered as an enhanced 
interrogation technique, detainees were allegedly deprived of sleep for up to 180 hours. 
Moreover, rectal rehydration was used as a way of controlling the behaviour of some of the 
detainees, as opposed to a medically-sanctioned method of ‘force feeding’ to keep detainees 
on hunger strike alive.416  
Furthermore, the Senate Committee report into torture at Guantanamo Bay concluded that there 
was little accountability, and states that “CIA officers and CIA contractors who were found to 
have violated CIA policies or performed poorly were rarely held accountable or removed from 
positions of responsibility”417 These examples appear to indicate a potential unwillingness on 
part of the State to prosecute wayward staff responsible for brutal treatment, as long as it 
appears to have achieved the desired result. It could be argued that this is hardly conductive to 
an honest State that can be trusted to be involved in the torture of suspected terrorists.  
Hafetz however does not appear to believe that criminal proceedings are a necessity for State 
accountability, and identifies three further ways in which a State can be accountable: 
                                                          
415 BBC News, ‘Obama exempts CIA 'torture' staff’ (BBC News, 17/04/2009) 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8003537.stm, Accessed: 23/05/2016 
416 Diane Feinstein, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 03/12/2014, ‘Committee Study of the Central 
Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program’, Findings and Conclusions, 109 
417 Diane Feinstein, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 03/12/2014, ‘Committee Study of the Central 
Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program’, Findings and Conclusions, 21 
‘Opposition to criminal prosecution… may channel the focus towards other accountability 
mechanisms, such as truth and reconciliation commissions, national commissions of inquiry 
or victim compensation schemes.’418 It could be suggested that before a State could regulate 
the complicity of torture, the State would need to reconcile with past wrongs in respect to any 
alleged previous participation in torture. However, both the Al Sweady Inquiry419 and the 
Senate Committee Report420 have both been accused of promoting insufficient remedies for 
past actions - whereas it could be argued that States accused of involvement in torture post 9/11 
have resisted criminal proceedings and inquiries because their actions were prohibited, it may 
be considered difficult to comprehend that said States could establish an accountable system 
on the back of such actions. It may also raise questions as to whether a State could achieve 
accountability within a regulated system of torture complicity.  
 
Reputational Damage 
The reputational consequence of a democratic State that either uses torture or will assist in the 
use of torture is important to discuss, because all States party to international bodies (such as 
ECHR, UDHR etc.) are obligated to protect fundamental freedoms, including freedom from 
torture. The UK for example is internationally known for upholding human rights, and 
                                                          
418 Jonathan Hafetz, ‘Resisting accountability: transitional justice in the post-9/11 United States’ [2015] 19(4) 
The International Journal of Human Rights 429, 430 
419 Tim Wood, ‘A Few Rotten Apples’: A Review of Alleged Detainee Abuse by British Personnel in Iraq 
Following the Al Sweady Inquiry. Is There Still a Case to Answer?’ [2015] 21(1) Journal of Conflict & Security 
Law 1, 28 
420 Both the American Civil Liberties Union and Amnesty International criticized the US for not prosecuting 
those involved in the torture and ill-treatment of detainees – ACLU, ‘Senate Torture Report Shows Need For 
Accountability’ (ACLU, 09/12/2014) www.aclu.org/news/senate-torture-report-shows-need-
accountability?redirect=national-security/senate-torture-report-shows-need-accountability, Accessed: 
17/06/2016; Amnesty International, ‘USA: Senate summary report on CIA detention programme must not be 
end of story’ (Amnesty International, 09/12/2014,) www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/12/usa-senate-
summary-report-cia-detention-programme-must-not-be-end-story/, Accessed: 17/06/2016 
encouraging other States to do the same.421 The UK Foreign Office funds several programmes 
for the promotion of human rights internationally, including the Preventing Sexual Violence in 
Conflict Initiative in 2012,422 and the Strategy for Abolition of the Death Penalty.423 It could 
be argued that autocratic States such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran etc., where there are 
human rights concerns,424 would not suffer the same level of reputational damage as the UK or 
the US, for either using torture or assisting with torture. This is because autocratic States are 
already known for their lack of human rights consideration within aspects of their justice and 
penal systems.425 For example, during the operation of the extraordinary rendition programme, 
there did not appear to be an outcry over the alleged involvement of Morocco426 or Egypt, but 
there was international astonishment over the alleged involvement of brutality by UK and US 
forces in the Abu Ghraib scandal.427 Subsequently, the reputation of a State that will assist in 
torture may be considered no better than the State that actually uses torture, much like the 
Courts view that complicity in a crime is equal to committing the crime itself.  
                                                          
421 Gov.uk ‘Human Rights and Democracy Report 2014’ (Gov.uk, 21/04/2016) 
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422 Gov.uk, ‘2010 to 2015 government policy: sexual violence in conflict’ (Gov.uk, 08/05/2015) 
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423 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, revised October 2011, ‘HMG Strategy for Abolition of the Death Penalty 
2010-2015’, Available: 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/35448/death-penalty-strategy-oct-
11-15.pdf, Accessed: 19/05/2016 
424 The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office lists a number of countries as a ‘Human Rights Priority Country’ 
in its 2015 ‘Human Rights and Democracy’ Report, first published 21st April 2016, Available: 
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425 Saudi Arabia for example has been criticised for its execution rate, after executing 157 people in 2015 – 
Associated Press, ‘Saudi Arabia: beheadings reach highest level in two decades’ (The Guardian, 02/01/2016) 
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/02/saudi-arabia-beheadings-reach-highest-level-in-two-decades, 
Accessed: 17/06/2016 
426 The Guardian, ‘MI6 and CIA 'sent student to Morocco to be tortured'’ (The Guardian, 11/12/2005) 
www.theguardian.com/world/2005/dec/11/politics.alqaida, Accessed: 22/05/2016 
427 ‘the graphic display of photographs of abuse in Abu Ghraib prison shocked the world’ - Marcy Strauss (2005) 
‘The Lessons of Abu Ghraib’ 66 Ohio St. L.J. 1269, 1270 - 1271 
The UK has what is arguably one of the most respected judicial systems in the world.428 
However, allowing the use of information obtained by the abuse of an individual’s human 
rights would almost certainly taint its reputation,429 regardless of if the UK has itself used 
torture. The UK currently holds a seat on the UN Human Rights Council,430 a position which 
could appear contradictory if the UK decided to allow its agents to be complicit, in what is 
detectably one of the most deplorable human rights abuses. For example, when Saudi Arabia, 
a State known for its human rights abuses, secured a position of expertise in the UN Human 
Rights Council in 2015, the decision was met with derision from many media outlets and 
human rights campaigners.431 Clearly, there was some confusion as to how a State that 
outwardly appears to have little concern for the most basic human rights of even its own 
citizens, is supposed to be involved in the human rights concerns of what is possibly one of the 
most influential international bodies. There is potentially already some damage to the 
reputation of the UK because of its alleged complicity in torture post 9/11,432 although it could 
be argued that any reputational flaws the UK may now have is because torture and complicity 
are currently prohibited, as opposed to the actual act of complicity itself. It could therefore be 
suggested that the reputation of a State is more damaging if they are using torture/information 
deriving from torture illegitimately, as opposed to its use within the confines of an accountable, 
regulated system.  
                                                          
428 The UK ranked at number 12 of 102 countries surveyed in the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law survey - 
World Justice Project, ‘Rule of Law Index 2015’, Available: 
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This chapter has established that the morals of torture and assisting acts are subject to change, 
depending on who has used torture and who will be subjected to torture. Subsequently, it is 
difficult to justify such a controversial act, and harder still to enshrine such acts in law, when 
those morals are likely to change. However, it has identified that torture and assisting acts 
would be morally justified if the ticking bomb scenario was to arise. Conversely, the ticking 
bomb scenario is incredibly unlikely to ever happen under the conditions assumed by those that 
champion torture law. Furthermore, the reputational damage that a State would potentially 
suffer after employing torture law could seriously affect its partnerships with foreign agencies. 
Moreover, a State that is willing to assist torture is likely to adopt the direct use of torture itself. 
Subsequently, it can only be concluded that regulating the assistance of torture, or the 
acceptance of information obtained by torture, would be detrimental to the counter-terror effort.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this thesis was to discuss the legal and moral issues surrounding the theoretical 
complicity in torture, or use of information obtained by torture, whilst critically examining the 
adoption of previously discussed torture law proposals in the context of complicity. The first 
thing this thesis discussed was whether the current threat of terrorism is sufficient enough to 
justify the complicity of torture. Whilst the likelihood for a high-fatality terror attack could be 
described as minimum, the possibility of a terrorist group obtaining CBRN materials is a 
terrifying thought, because it could cause permanent, catastrophic damage. Worse still, the 
threat of terror is not only at home, but as shown by attacks such as the ones at Madison Blu 
and Tunisia, abroad as well. Furthermore, the threat of cyberterrorism has grown as more and 
more people use the internet and technology on a regular basis, making cyberterrorism a 
particular vulnerability. It can therefore only be concluded that there is a sufficient terror risk 
that could morally justify complicity in torture. 
What then of the risk of the ticking bomb scenario ever coming to fruition? It is certain that the 
ticking bomb scenario is the biggest government nightmare. Knowing that an attack will 
happen and being unable to make the instigator of the attack prevent it from happening, it is 
understandable that the government would aim to safeguard against this, and have a ‘Plan B’ 
for if everything else fails. However, because terror plots are primarily used to inspire fear, it 
is likely that the fear of the ticking bomb is far more serious than the likelihood of it. 
Additionally, the requirements listed by Shue433 and Kleinig434 make it near impossible that the 
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231 
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ticking bomb will ever occur. Therefore, the risk of the ticking bomb is not justification for the 
complicity of torture.  
Dershowitz’s torture warrants concept would not work, because the warrants system could be 
easily avoided by applicants that have been rejected by a judge. Furthermore, even if a warrant 
was issued correctly, because both the warrants system and criminal justice system are judicial, 
there is the potential for a conflict of interests because there is no ‘vetting’. Moreover, allowing 
the assistance of ‘torture lite’ in an attempt to be ethically complicit would not work because 
an individual’s pain threshold is difficult to determine, making the ethical argument irrelevant. 
Likewise, the defence of necessity would also be unworkable, because as shown in Gafgen v 
Germany,435 the State may be reluctant to prosecute its own agents, especially if those agents 
have prevented a threat from occurring. Furthermore, the defence of ‘official disobedience’ 
would not work for the same reason. Although both defence proposals are legally and morally 
sound, they would not work in practice.  
Although there are various forms of intelligence collection, interrogation is the one that has the 
potential to be most useful, not least because the information is received immediately. Still, it 
does rely on the suspect truthfully answering the questions put to them, hence torture is 
discussed as a way to ‘make them talk’. However, as discussed in the fourth chapter of this 
thesis, torture does not work, because the suspect may give the torturer false information, or 
may not have the information that the torturer is looking for, 
It is unlikely that a suspect would be able to provide useful information when, as discussed in 
the first chapter of this thesis, terror groups will change their methods and plans if they suspect 
one of their own is detained. Furthermore, the suspect would likely to be someone who has not 
been convicted of terrorism, which means it would be unknown as to whether the suspect even 
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was a terrorist, and therefore if they even had information to provide. Subsequently, when this 
information is exchanged, the receiving State may then waste valuable resources by chasing 
leads based on the false information given to them. It is therefore safe to say, that the 
information obtained by torture may not enhance current methods of intelligence collection.  
In fact, complicity is more likely to have a detrimental effect on intelligence collection, 
particularly when working with other States. Other States (and their intelligence agencies) may 
not want to be partners or otherwise associated, with a State that commits, allows, or actively 
uses information obtained by torture. This can have effects on several major methods used in 
countering terrorism, such as intelligence sharing, deportation,436 and the prosecution of 
terrorists at home and abroad.437 These elements are particularly important considering the 
threat of terrorism to tourists. 
To conclude, although the threat of terrorism is sufficient enough to justify the use of 
information obtained by torture, or otherwise being complicit in the use of torture, none of the 
previous proposals discussed within this thesis would be legally or morally workable. In 
addition, previous use of torture post-9/11 indicates that if complicity in torture was to become 
legal, those legal boundaries could be pushed by intelligence officials, or those otherwise in 
use of complicity tactics, as shown at the Guantanamo Bay facility. Furthermore, legalising 
complicity in torture is unlikely to remain limited at complicit acts, and so could initiate the 
slippery slope. Moreover, although the potential information that could be gained from using 
torture is information that would be otherwise difficult to obtain, the information itself might 
be incorrect or misleading. Essentially, there would be no point regulating torture complicity 
because the information received by States that have used torture might not be accurate. 
Additionally, other States that do not want to be associated with torture may refuse to work 
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437 A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2)[2005] UKHL 71 
with complicit States outright, which would only be to the detriment of the complicit State. 
Subsequently, the complicity of torture and/or the use information obtained by torture should 
not become part of the State’s legal framework, or otherwise part of their counter-terrorism 
initiative.  
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